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1 Introduction 
On September 13
th
 1993, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin shook hands on the lawn before the White House in Washington D.C. 
The two former arch enemies had just signed the Declaration of Principles, the first 
official agreement ever between Israel and the Palestinians. The signing became a 
world sensation; it brought hopes for peace in one of the world‟s most intractable 
contemporary conflicts.
1
 
Israel and the Palestinians had not reached their agreement without outside help, 
however. In late August 1993, it became known that a small state in the northernmost 
corner of Europe, with seemingly no connection to the Middle East conflict, had 
played a key role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Accords. Norwegian 
academics and politicians had established a secret back channel between the two 
parties, and they had succeeded in negotiating an agreement where much more 
powerful third parties, like the US, had failed.
2
 The Norwegian third party role did not 
go unnoticed. The media response and public attention was massive, both in Norway 
an internationally, and the secret negotiations were consequently termed „the Oslo 
Back Channel‟ or the „Oslo Process‟. Similarly, the negotiated Declaration of 
Principles was baptized the „Oslo Accords‟ by the world press.3  
The object of study in this thesis is not the Middle East peace process and Norway‟s 
role in it.
4
 The event of the signing of the peace accords, and the attention Norway 
received, are nevertheless highly relevant here. In their wake, and supported by the 
                                            
1 Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003, p. 82; Tamnes, Rolf 1997, p. 384; Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2004, p. 221; 
Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2007, p. 157 
2 Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2004, pp. 221f; Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2007, pp. 157ff.  
3 Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2007, p. 175, see also Matlary, Janne Haaland 2002 
4 There already exists a comprehensive academic literature on this theme. See for example Butenschøn, Nils A. 1997; 
Corbin, Jane 1994a; Corbin, Jane 1994b; Tamnes, Rolf 1997, pp. 376-384; Tveit, Odd Karsten 2006; Waage, Hilde 
Henriksen 2000; Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2004; Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2007 
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momentum from the accolade Norway earned, a policy of substantial international 
peace engagement was adopted.
5
  
The wish to promote international peace, and the willingness to engage actively 
towards this end, were by no means innovations in Norwegian foreign policy thinking. 
In a major foreign policy study, the historian Rolf Tamnes views the „engagement 
policy‟ as one of the most distinct features of Norwegian foreign policy from the 
1960s and onwards. „Engagement policy‟ denotes Norway‟s moral engagement and 
the wish to be an international front runner.
6
 Similarly, Olav Riste, in his historical 
study of Norway‟s foreign relations, underlines that the „missionary impulse‟,  “the 
conviction that Norway has a special role to play in leading the world up the straight 
and narrow path towards a peace based on international justice and humanitarian 
values”7, is one of the most important and long-standing driving forces in Norway‟s 
foreign policy.
8
  
It should also be noted that Norway also prior to the Middle East peace process had 
been involved in attempts at conflict resolution and engagement in specific peace 
processes. In 1989, academics at Christian Michelsen Institute attempted at facilitating 
negotiations between the parties to the conflict in South Sudan.
9
 The same year, a 
Norwegian initiative to bring the parties in the Guatemalan civil war to the negotiation 
table gradually brought Norway into the peace process.
10
 And in 1990, Arne Fjørtoft, a 
Norwegian NGO representative, tried to involve Norway in peace talks at Sri Lanka.
11
 
However, until the autumn of 1993, all these efforts retained a distinctly ad hoc 
character. They were mainly the result of individual initiatives by academics and NGO 
                                            
5 Butenschøn, Nils A. 1997, pp. 371, 386; Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kristen Alsaker 2003, p. 95; Riste, Olav 2001, pp. 272; 
Tamnes, Rolf 1997, pp. 444ff; Butenschøn, Nils A. 1997, pp. 371, 386  
6 Tamnes, Rolf 1997, pp. 339, 469, see also 339-447  
7 Riste, Olav 2001, p. 255 
8 Ibid, p. 255f 
9 Tamnes, Rolf 1997, p. 446 
10 Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003, pp. 252ff; see also Bucher-Johannessen, Bernt 1999, pp. 213f; Kelleher, 
Ann & Taulbee, James Larry 2006, pp. 488f, 491 
11 Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003, p. 104; Tamnes, Rolf 1997, p. 446 
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workers; they received little public attention; and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs seemingly had no explicit strategy for this kind of involvements.12 
The real turning point came with the massive attention to the „Oslo Back Channel‟ and 
Norway‟s efforts in the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. In its wake, 
Norway became established as an important peace promoter internationally, 
possessing particular qualities as a mediator and facilitator. Norway‟s potential in 
contributing to conflict resolution was consequently very optimistically assessed.
13
 
The result was a distinct increase in the Norwegian efforts in peace promotion and 
reconciliation.
14
 Norway became involved in an increasing number of peace processes, 
and the peace promotion was elevated to an important part of the country‟s foreign 
policy.  
Today, fifteen years after the sensational revelation of Norway‟s role in negotiating the 
„Oslo Accords‟, the peace engagement still goes strong. Norway is probably involved 
in more peace processes than ever, and the resources spent on various kinds of peace 
promotion have rocketed since 1993. The engagement has also become more 
institutionalized; in 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established Section for peace 
and reconciliation to coordinate the Norwegian involvements, and a number of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees now work almost exclusively with peace 
promotion. 
1.1 Research Question and Analytic Approach 
The massive scope of the peace promotion efforts, the amount of resources spent, and 
the importance it has assumed in the country‟s foreign policy, are intriguing: how can 
it be that a small and remote state like Norway adopts such an activist policy to further 
peace around the globe? I am certainly not the first to pose this question; there already 
exists a considerable body of scholarly literature that explores it from various 
                                            
12 Matlary, Janne Haaland 2002, pp. 51, 54f; Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003, p. 102 
13 Gjerdåker, Svein 1997, p. 237; Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003, pp. 95f, 103f; Riste, Olav 2001, p. 272; 
Sørbø, Gunnar 1997, p. 251; Tamnes, Rolf 1997, pp.443f 
14
 Butenschøn, Nils A. 1997, pp. 386; Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003, pp. 14, 81, 98,105; Riste, Olav 2001, pp. 
255, 273; Tamnes, Rolf 1997, pp. 443-447  
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perspectives.
15
 However, and with the exception of the analyses of Halvard Leira, 
Leira et al., Terje Tvedt, and Thune & Larsen, the literature mainly focuses on the 
intentions and motivations behind the engagement. It analyzes the interplay between 
and relative saliency of altruism on the one hand and instrumental considerations 
based on national self interests on the other, and its explanations for the Norwegian 
peace engagement rely heavily on this analysis. In other words, it tries to answer why 
Norway adopted an activist peace policy. 
This analysis aims at complementing the insights in the existing literature by posing a 
different kind of question and trying to answer it. Rather than looking at the intentions 
behind the Norwegian policy, I aim at highlighting the preconditions for its adoption 
and continuation. My basic research question is thus a how- possible question
16
:  
How has the Norwegian peace engagement policy been made possible? And how has it 
been constructed as a natural and important part of Norwegian foreign policy?  
In order to be able to give a non-trivial answer, I adopt a discourse analytic approach. I 
will, in other words, focus on how the peace engagement has been spoken and written 
about from the early 1990s and up to 2008. The underlying argument here, which will 
be elaborated on in the analysis, is that in this period, a Norwegian peace engagement 
discourse
17
 can be identified. My approach is broad, analyzing a wide variety of 
empirical textual sources, including Government White Papers, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs‟ Foreign Policy Addresses to the Storting, and other texts emanating 
from the Government; parliamentary foreign policy debates; and newspaper articles. 
                                            
15 Most of the existing studies of contemporary Norwegian foreign policy and aid policy analyze the peace engagement in 
greater or lesser detail. See for example Bucher–Johannessen, Bernt 1999; Kelleher, Ann & Taulbee, James Larry 2006; 
Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007; Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kirsten Alsaker 2003; Lodgaard, Sverre 2000; Matlary, Janne Haaland 
2001; Matlary, Janne Haaland 2002; Skogmo, Bjørn 2000; Riste, Olav 2001; Stokke, Olav 2005; Sørbø, Gunnar 1997; Sørbø, 
Gunnar 2000; Tamnes, Rolf 1997; Thune, Henrik & Larsen, Torgeir 2000; Tvedt, Terje 2003; Tvedt, Terje 2006. See also 
Leira, Halvard 2004; Leira, Halvard 2005. 
16 Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1993, pp. 298. Doty here distinguishes between ’why questions’, leading to a focus on why decisions 
were made given a set of circumstances, and ‘how-possible questions’, pointing in the direction of studying the 
preconditions for the adoption of certain policies 
17 I argue that this discourse may be seen as distinct from, but drawing on and relating to, the general foreign policy 
discourse, the security discourse, the development aid discourse, and the already existing peace discourse. Halvard Leira 
has studied this latter discourse, and argues that it has influenced Norwegian foreign policy thinking from about 1890 and 
onwards. Leira, Halvard 2002, 2004, 2005; Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007. However, I argue that the peace engagement 
discourse is a more specific discourse, emerging at the same time as the activist Norwegian peace promotion policy was 
established. 
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The inclusion of a large body of material prevents me from analyzing single texts in 
detail, but it allows me to get a general overview of the discourse and ensures that no 
major discursive developments are ignored.  
This kind of broad, empirical investigation of the contemporary peace engagement 
discourse has, as far as I know, not been conducted before. However, there do exist 
some analyses on related subjects that have similar theoretical and methodological 
starting points; Halvard Leira has analyzed the historical Norwegian peace discourse 
in detail
18
, Leira et al. have studied Norwegian self images in relation to foreign 
policy
19
, and Terje Tvedt has adopted a discourse analytic perspective in parts of his 
seminal study of the Norwegian „South political system‟20. I build on the approaches 
and findings of these analyses, particularly the two former, aiming at complementing 
their insights with empirical findings from the period under study. 
Employing discourse analysis as the theoretical and methodological foundation of the 
analysis implies that the focus is on uncovering the shared or intersubjective 
understandings that appear in the empirical material, and the structures of meaning that 
are established therein. The basic assumption underlying the approach is that these 
understandings and meanings are socially constructed in discourse and have a 
fundamental influence on our worldviews, self images, perceptions, and frames of 
understanding; and therefore also our perceived interests. The discursively constructed 
intersubjective meanings and understandings are thus seen as preconditions for the 
adoption of policies, including the Norwegian peace engagement policy.  
One caveat is in its place here: I do not view the peace engagement discourse as 
monolithic. Within the discourse, there exist different positions or ways of viewing the 
engagement, or representations. A representation may here be defined as „reality‟; or 
as a packet of claims about reality, a bundle of concepts, notions, intersubjective 
understandings, and meanings, that structures and patterns texts that belong to it.
21
 
                                            
18 Leira, Halvard 2002, 2004, 2005 
19 Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007 
20 Tvedt, Terje 2003; see also Tvedt, Terje 2006  
21
 Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 33, 51, 60ff, 94, 177f. The definition of representation given here is a combination of the 
different definitions Neumann presents. For a further discussion, see theory and methodology chapter. 
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Drawing out and presenting the different representations, and analyzing their relative 
strength within the discourse, is an important part of the analysis.  
Given that discourses and representations establish important preconditions for the 
formulation of policy, detailed studies of their nature and of what they do may yield 
non-controversial findings from a scholarly point of view. In this thesis, I aim at 
detailing the emergence, establishment, evolution, and stability of the peace 
engagement discourse, and its effects on Norwegian policy. I am particularly 
interested in how the discourse has legitimized, naturalized, defended, and perpetuated 
the extensive Norwegian peace engagement, and how it has contributed to the 
establishment of the engagement as an important part of the country‟s foreign policy.  
1.2 Disposition 
In the second chapter, I present discourse analysis as the theoretical and 
methodological basis of the thesis. Key theoretical assumptions and concepts are 
elaborated on, and I detail how the analysis will be conducted. The next part of the 
thesis is the analysis. The analysis is presented in four chapters, each of them detailing 
the discourse in one temporal period. The first chapter is brief; it presents the 
longstanding Norwegian peace discourse and the discursive position of the concepts of 
„peace‟ and „peace promotion‟ in the years prior to the revelation of the Norwegian 
involvement in the Middle East peace process in 1993. The next chapter analyzes the 
emergence and establishment of a distinct peace engagement discourse, and a 
dominant representation therein, in the years from 1993 to 1997. The third concerns 
the consolidation and reproduction of the established discourse in the 1997 to 2003 
period. The last analyses the increasing criticism of the peace engagement, the rise of 
the alternative representations, the subsequent opening of the discourse, and the signs 
of discursive struggle that ensued from 2003 and up to 2008. The conclusion draws 
together the findings of the analysis, discusses them, and looks at the discourse‟s 
effects on the Norwegian foreign policy in general and the peace promotion policy 
specifically. I also suggest some directions for further research. 
7 
 
2 Theory and Methodology 
This thesis is theoretically and methodologically inspired by discourse analytic 
approaches. I have chosen to conduct a discourse analysis because it seems well suited 
to give new insights into how the Norwegian peace engagement was made possible. 
Discourse analysis focuses on identifying the discursive preconditions for the adoption 
of policies. In other words, it allows us to study how discursively constructed 
meanings, knowledge, identities, and self images influence decisions and practice, 
making some policies possible while excluding others. It thus has the potential for 
denaturalizing policies that appear as obvious or necessary in a given context.
22
 
In this chapter, I present and discuss what I view as central meta-theoretical and 
theoretical premises and claims. I argue that discourse analytic theory draws on 
general meta-theoretical assumptions about the social construction of meaning, 
knowledge, and social reality; and on more specific claims about language, discourses, 
and practice. The resulting framework may be employed to analyze the role of 
discourses in political processes.
23
 
Then follow a discussion of methodological issues and a presentation of the concrete 
approach of this thesis. I aim to show how discourse analysis may function as a tool 
for textual analysis geared towards uncovering the role of discourses in the production 
and reproduction of intersubjective meanings and knowledge.  At the outset, it should 
be noted that discourse analysis is a diverse body of scholarship, and that we may 
distinguish between several different and partly incompatible theories and 
methodologies. The framework I present here draws on insights from several of these, 
while striving for theoretical coherence.
24
 
                                            
22 Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1993, pp. 298f; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 236; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 83 
23 See for example Mathisen, Werner Christie 1998, p. 3; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 9, 12ff; 
Hardy, Cynthia and Phillips, Nelson 2002, pp. 4-9 
24 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 12, 16, 143. The authors argue that it is desirable to draw on 
different approaches and customize the theoretical framework to the object under study as long as the resulting 
framework is theoretically coherent. 
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2.1 Discourse Analysis as Theory  
2.1.1 Meta-theory 
On the level of meta-theory, I view discourse analysis as a poststructuralist approach 
drawing on and compatible with social constructivist key tenets.
25
 At the core of social 
constructivism lie two claims, specifying its stance on the nature of meaning, 
knowledge, and social reality: “(…) social constructivism is epistemologically about 
the social construction of meaning and knowledge and ontologically about the 
construction of social reality.”26  
This implies that the social world is viewed as context specific, contingent, and open 
to change.
27
 It is made up of intersubjectively meaningful structures and processes. 
Material resources, events, and actions have no inherent or „natural‟ meaning; they 
acquire meaning and are made intelligible through interpretation. The interpretation, in 
turn, is based on the social context generally, and on structures of shared 
(intersubjective) understandings and knowledge specifically.
28
  
Intersubjective understandings, worldviews and knowledge are, in other words, viewed 
as the lenses through which we interpret the world, and as constituting reality. They 
are not reflecting an objective and given world “out there”; they are rather the results 
of social construction. As such, they are historically and culturally specific, defined 
and shaped through processes of social interaction and practice where shared truths are 
established. It follows that they are subject to continual struggles about their content.
29
  
                                            
25
 Here, I take as my starting point studies that view discourse analysis as a social constructivist approach. See for example 
Adler, Emanuel 2002, pp. 95, 97f; Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2006, pp. 6f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, s. 
13f; Milliken, Jennifer 1995, s. 229f; Phillips, Nelson & Hardy, Cynthia 2002, pp. 2, 5, 10. The claim that discourse analysis 
can be subsumed under the category of social constructivism is not completely uncontroversial, however. Lene Hansen 
and Ole Wæver for example view discourse analysis as a poststructural theory, and poststructuralism as incompatible 
with social constructivism. Hansen, Lene 2002, p. 4f; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 1-5; Wæver, Ole 2002, p. 21ff. Iver B. 
Neumann similarly argues that all discourse analysis is poststructuralist. Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 24 
26 Guzzini, Stefano 2000, p. 147, see also pp. 149, 159-162. Guzzini is quoted in Adler, Emanuel 2002, p. 95, see also 100f.  
27 Adler, Emanuel 2002, p. 96, see also 100f; Hopf, Ted 1998, p. 175f; Guzzini, Stefano 2000, p. 154f; Jørgensen, Marianne 
Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, s. 13f.  
28 Adler, Emanuel 2002, p. 100; Guzzini, Stefano 2000, p. 159; Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998, p. 326 
29
 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 13f. See also Adler, Emanuel 2002, pp. 95, 100; Guzzini, Stefano 
2000, p. 164 
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It should also be noted that social constructivist meta-theory views agents and 
structures as mutually constituted or constructed. Agency and actions are embedded in 
structural context, and are therefore constituted, or given meaning, by it. At the same 
time, actions, understood as practice, are crucial for the reproduction of the structure. 
The structure may in other words change as a result of changing practice.
30
 
Constructivists thus focus on the interaction between the structural and individual 
level, in theory attaching equal importance to both.
 31
  
2.1.2 The discourse analytic view of language   
The theoretical core of all discourse analysis is, in line with structuralist and 
poststructuralist language philosophy, the importance of language and discourse in the 
social construction of the world.
32
 Discourse analytic theory rejects the positivistic, 
instrumentalist, and referential view of language as a transparent and neutral tool that 
acts as a medium for the communication, dissemination and registration of data.
33
 
Language is not viewed as reflecting an objective and material reality; rather, it is of 
pivotal importance in its construction and organization. Language shapes what we 
think and do; it draws boundaries for what is thinkable and doable.
34
  
In discourse analytic theory, the social nature of language is emphasized. In line with 
social constructivist meta-theory, language is viewed as an important intersubjective 
structure in which meaning and understanding is created. It is not a private property of 
the individual; it is intersubjective of nature, a series of collective codes and 
conventions that individuals need to employ to make themselves understood.
35
 
Drawing on structuralist and poststructuralist language philosophy, language is viewed 
as a relationally structured system of signs. The meaning of each sign is defined by its 
                                            
30 Adler, Emanuel 2002, pp 100f; Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998, pp. 326, 340ff; Hopf, Ted 1998, p. 178 
31
 Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998, pp. 326, 340ff. Checkel emphasizes that studying agency and structure simultaneously is very 
problematic in practice. Most scholars end up bracketing one or the other (usually the individual level), thus violating the 
underlying ontology. The relationship between agents and structure has also been the subject of heated controversies 
and theoretical debates within the constructivist camp. For a brief overview, see Adler, Emanuel 2002, pp. 104ff.  
32 For discussions of the commonalities between structuralist and poststructuralist language philosophy and discourse 
analytic theories, see Jørgensen, Marianne Winther & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 17-21; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 18-24 
33 Wæver, Ole 2002, p. 24, 28; see also Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 18.  
34 Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 305f, 326f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winther & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 18; 
Phillips, Nelson & Hardy, Cynthia 2002, p. 6 
35 Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 17 
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relation to other signs, that is, through a series of juxtapositions. One element is often 
valued over its opposite, creating a structure where signs are differentiated, not just in 
meaning, but also in value.
36
 However, and in line with the poststructuralist critique of 
structuralism, the relationships between the signs are viewed as inherently unstable. 
The meaning of a sign can not be fixed indefinitely because its place within the web of 
relations may change. Structures exist, but they are temporary and changeable.
37
 
Empirical investigation of the changing meaning of signs and their links to other signs 
may therefore be an important part of a discourse analysis. 
2.1.3 Defining discourse and representation  
While the importance of language remains undisputed, discourse analysis goes beyond 
pure linguistic analyses that focus exclusively on language and its structure.
38
 
Discourses do not consist of language alone; they also include practices and patterns of 
action. They are inscribed in institutions, and they therefore have a material 
expression.
39
 Discourse analysis thus aims to include language, social practice and the 
material in an integrated perspective, exploring the relation between them and how 
they influence and constitute each other.
40
 
A proper definition of discourse should incorporate these insights. In this thesis, I draw 
on a definition proposed by Iver B. Neumann: 
A discourse is a system for the production of a set of statements and practices which, 
through inscribing themselves in institutions and appearing as more or less normal, 
constitute reality for its bearers and has a certain degree of regularity in a set of social 
relations.
41
  
This definition captures the capacity of discourses to produce new statements and 
practices, and to constitute reality for its bearers. The social importance of discourses 
                                            
36 Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 19; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter og Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 17-23; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 229; 
Wæver, Ole 2002, pp. 24, 29 
37
 Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 19; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter og Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 20f; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 229; 
Wæver, Ole 2002, p. 24, 29 
38
 Discourse analysis thus mirrors Mikhail Bhaktin’s critique of structural linguistics (Ferdinand de Saussure). While de 
Saussure draws a clear line between langue (language understood as a relational system) and parole (the spoken word, 
the specific speech act), and privileges the former as the object of linguistics, Bhaktin argues that parole must be included 
in our analyses to make us able to understand the social importance of language. Jørgensen, Marianne Winter og Phillips, 
Louise 1999, p. 19ff; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 18ff  
39 Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 38, 80f 
40
 Ibid, pp. 38, 81, see also 80 
41 Ibid, p. 18, my translation, italics added. For a related definition, see Wæver, Ole 2002, p. 29 
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is in other words highlighted. So are some of the mechanisms through which 
discourses work; discourses influence and shape institutions, and they appear as 
normal, obvious or self-evident. They may, as a result, be taken as given, and their 
effects may therefore be seen as „natural‟. Discourses can thus be viewed as 
intersubjective structures that construct reality through producing meaning, 
knowledge, and world images, thus providing individuals with the basis for their 
decisions.  
The concept of discourse is, within the discourse analytic literature, used in a variety 
of ways and specified at different levels. Some theorists for example identify several 
competing discourses that partly cover same social domain, inscribing the same 
concepts with different meanings.
42
 Here, I again follow Iver B. Neumann, who uses 
the concept of representation to denote such different positions or „realities‟. Neumann 
gives several different definitions of representation. I combine several of these and 
construct my own: 
A representation may be defined as a structuring set of lenses through which we view the 
world. Consisting of a system of intersubjective understandings, meanings, and concepts 
constructed in and through language, it constitutes reality for its carriers.
43
  
Within one discourse, there usually exist several competing representations. The 
concept of discourse is in other words seen as denoting a more overarching level.
44
 In 
this thesis, I for example use the term „peace engagement discourse‟ to denote the 
totality of utterances and texts concerning Norway‟s peace engagement, and the 
structures of meaning established therein. I will use this terminology throughout; when 
referring to theorists that use „discourse‟ to denote phenomena similar to what I have 
defined as „representation‟, I will use „representation‟. 
2.1.4 What do discourses and representations do? Discursive productivity 
The rationale behind the use of discourse analysis in social science is that discourses 
and representations have implications beyond themselves, implications relevant for our 
                                            
42 See for example Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 51ff; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 69f, 83, 146f.  
43 This definition is based on Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 33, 51, 60ff, 94, 177f.  
44 Jørgensen & Phillips use the term ‘discursive order’ in much the same way as I use discourse. Discursive order denotes 
the competing and overlapping discourses within a particular social domain. Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, 
Louise 1999, pp. 69f, 83, 146f. 
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understanding of social reality. At the very heart of discourse analytic theory thus lays 
the claim that discourses and representations are productive. In line with social 
constructivist meta-theory, this implies that the representations we employ shape and 
construct intersubjective structures such as truth, knowledge, worldviews, identities, 
self-images, categories, models and perceptions. Representations provide the lenses 
and identities through which we perceive the social and material world, inscribe 
objects with meaning, and thus produce the basis on which we make decisions and act. 
They are, as such, constitutive of reality.
45
   
The basis for this view is the assertion that human beings are unable to perceive or 
grasp the physical and social world independently of language. We do not have direct 
access to the world as it „really is‟; what appears as reality for us is a result of filtering, 
ordering, interpretation, and inscription of meaning in sense impressions through 
discursively constituted frames, categories, and models.
46
 In Lene Hansen‟s words: 
“There is no „extra-discursive‟ materiality that sets itself forward independently of its 
discursive representation (…)”47 This does not imply a rejection of the text-
independent existence of objects; it implies that these objects have no meaning for us 
as human beings outside language and discourse. We cannot grasp the world directly; 
the material is always discursively mediated. Discourses and representations construct 
meaning and intersubjective structures, thus producing social reality. They are in other 
words ontologically productive, and an integral part of „reality‟.48  
Discourses are, however, not only productive of meaning. Jennifer Milliken neatly 
captures this point:  
The point here is that beyond giving a language for speaking about phenomena, 
discourses [and representations] make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting 
                                            
45Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 326f; Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1993, p. 302; Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 17; 
Jørgensen, Marianne Winter og Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 17f, 79; Milliken, Jennifer 1995, p. 229; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, 
pp. 23, 33, 38, 51, 60-63, 94, 177f 
46 Jørgensen, Marianne Winther & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 17f; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, pp. 236f; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, 
pp. 23, 30-36 
47 Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 25, see also pp. 18, 213; see also Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 23 
48Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 326f; Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1993, p. 302; Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 17; 
Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 17f; Milliken, Jennifer 1995, p. 229; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 23, 
38, 63; Phillips, Nelson & Hardy, Cynthia 2002, p. 6 
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towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular „regime of truth‟ while excluding 
other possible modes of identity and action.
49
  
Besides constructing objects and their meaning, discourses and representations define 
what practices and interventions are possible, logical, proper, and legitimate. At the 
same time, they exclude other practices and interventions, rendering them unthinkable 
or illegitimate. Discourses and representations also define which subjects are 
authorized to speak and act, thus empowering and privileging them, while others are 
excluded and silenced. They thus draw the boundaries for what is thinkable and 
doable, and shape what is regarded as truth and knowledge. Through the mechanisms 
of authorization and exclusion, discourses and representations produce and routinize 
practices, „regimes of truth‟, and knowledge, and heavily influence social relations.50   
2.1.5 Representations as relationally structured systems of signs 
As we have seen, discourse analytic theory attaches great importance to language, and 
views it as an intersubjective, relationally structured, and inherently unstable system of 
signs.
51
 Discourses and representations are viewed in a very similar way, and as 
having the same characteristics. We may say that language is the overarching system, 
while discourses and representations are smaller subsystems occupying specific social 
domains.  
The discourse analysts Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have developed a set of 
concepts that may be usefully employed to capture the systemic and unstable nature of 
discourses. Their starting point is that social phenomena are never total. Meaning can 
never be fixed or closed completely, and there is thus always room for contestation. 
Structures of meaning are established and challenged through conflicts, conventions 
and negotiations in a social space.
52
 Laclau & Mouffe thereby underline the inherent 
                                            
49 Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 229 
50
 Hopf, Ted 2002, pp. 15, 266f; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 229; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 38f, 133; Wæver, Ole 2002, p. 
29. Hopf finds that discourses, understood as social cognitive structure, establish what is thinkable and imaginable, 
excluding other ways of thinking and apprehending reality. It is not impossible to think outside the boundaries drawn by 
discourse, but it is difficult, and the probability of doing it is low. 
51 Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 19; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter og Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 17-23; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 229; 
Wæver, Ole 2002, pp. 24, 29. Jennifer Milliken indeed views ’discourses as structures of signification’ as one of three 
bundles of theoretical claims defining discourse analytic scholarship. 
52 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 34f 
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instability of discourses and representations. As such, they complement Neumann‟s 
definition of discourse, which focuses on their regularity. 
Laclau & Mouffe view representations as a temporary fixing of the meaning of words 
and terms (signs) within a particular domain. Representations thus fill signs with 
meaning. All representations have certain nodal points or key terms; privileged signs 
around which other signs are ordered and get their meaning in relation to. However, 
the meaning and content of nodal points are often particularly unstable. Different 
representations operating within the same social domain struggle to fill these nodal 
points with meaning and content and thus achieve discursive dominance. Such 
unstable nodal points are called floating signifiers. Identifying such floating signifiers 
is often central in concrete discourse analyses, and it is done through tracing conflict 
about the content and meaning of a sign.
53
 
Discursive dominance is achieved if the meaning of a term or sign appears as 
unproblematic or natural, and no competing or alternative representations present 
themselves. Such closure or fixing of meaning is, however, always temporary. 
Alternative, marginalized representations often exist; the challenge is identify them, 
include them in the analysis and thus denaturalize the dominant representation. When 
conducting a discourse analysis, it is always a goal to include and highlight what is 
excluded by dominant representations.
54
  
2.1.6 Discursive change and practice 
It follows from Laclau & Mouffe‟s theory that even apparently stable and dominating 
representations, having a high degree of regularity and appearing as „natural‟ or 
obvious for its bearers, may be challenged and changed.
55
 But how are we to 
understand discursive change? How does it come about? In discourse analytic theory, 
it is often seen as a result of practice.
56
 
                                            
53 Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 315-318; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 35-40 
54 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 39f, 147; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 230; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, 
pp. 52f, 60f 
55 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 20f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 19ff; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, pp. 
230, 242; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 60f, 94f 
56 Milliken, Jennifer 1999, p. 230; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 19ff; Friis, Karsten 2007, p. 89 
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The relationship between representations and social practice may be seen as dialectic. 
According to discourse analytic theory, practices are made intelligible and acquire 
meaning through their discursive representations. These representations thus structure 
practice. At the same time, representations exist only insofar as they are actualized in 
discursive and social practice. If representations are not actualized and have no bearing 
on social practice, they cease to exist. Practice and discursive representation is, in 
other words, mutually constitutive.
57
 They are not, however, seen as determining each 
other; changes in practice may occur without a preceding change in discourse.
58
 
This dialectic or mutually constitutive relationship implies that practices have the 
potential for changing discourses. The most obvious example is the potential for 
change inherent in discursive practices such as text production and consumption. Text 
production, involving concrete instances of language use, or articulation, draws on and 
is structured by existing discourses and representations.
59
 At the same time, it may 
involve creative combining of elements of existing structures and patterns, resulting in 
changes in the meaning of signs and key terms, and thus discursive change. The same 
is true for text consumption and interpretation; even though our reading and 
interpretation are structured by previous interpretations and the existing discourse, 
innovative readings leading to discursive change are always possible.
60
 
The issue of discursive change also touches upon the relation between discourses and 
human agents/ subjects. This relation has been subject to major meta-theoretical 
controversy, and at the theoretical level, it is doubtful whether it is possible to solve.
61
 
Some discourse analytic approaches view subjects‟ social position, actions, and 
                                            
57 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 1f, 5f, 10, 21, 28, 37; Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007, pp. 7ff; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, pp. 229f; 
Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 83. For a related point, see section on social constructivist meta-theory 
58 For a thorough discussion, see Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1997. See also Hansen, Lene 213 
59 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 144; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 23f. On the importance of focusing 
on explicit articulations in discourse analyses, see Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 41-44 
60 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 21, 39f, 81-85, 143-146 
61 Adler, Emanuel 2002, pp. 104ff; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 132. The most recent contributions to the debate (within 
International Relations) also seem to agree on the impossibility of a general solution. See Bieler, Andreas & Morton, 
Adam David 2001, p. 5; Wight, Colin 1999; Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1997 
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practices as fully determined by discourse; the subject is decentered and has no 
freedom of action or true agency.
62
  
However, at the practical level, I think it is fruitful to adopt a social constructivist 
ontology, viewing agents and structures as mutually constituted.
63
 With this starting 
point, we may view subjects, practices, and discursive representations as influencing 
each other. Existing representations are seen as frames limiting the subject‟s freedom 
of action and ability to be innovative. The very basis on which subjects act; their 
realities, identities, self-images, and social positions; are influenced by these 
representations.
64
  
Agency is thus embedded in and dependent upon discursive structures, but some 
degree of freedom of action always exists. Subjects always have the opportunity to 
resist the reality constituted by discourses and representations.
65
 The discursive 
representations do not fully determine the practice of subjects/ agents; in most 
instances, several lines of action are available, and it is possible to act with purpose, on 
the basis of intentions. Indeed, discourses only exist in and through discursive and 
social practices, and practices are intimately linked to, and inseparable from, actions 
by individuals or groups. Subjects carry out practices, and they may therefore 
influence and change them, at least to some extent.
66
 
Having outlined the propensity for change inherent in all discourses, and some of the 
mechanisms through which change may come about, it should be kept in mind that 
discourses may appear to be highly stable and resilient to change. In Iver B. 
Neumann‟s terminology, discourses have considerable inertia. Discourses exist in and 
rest on certain regularities in discursive practices, and they routinize certain social 
practices. These practices are partly self-sustaining; they reproduce the discourse and 
repel alternative practices that bear in them seeds for change. Discursive change is 
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 Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 312, 328; Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1993, pp. 298f, 302; Doty, Roxanne Lynn 
1997; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 24-27, 53-56 
63 See section on meta-theory 
64 Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1993, p. 302; Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 17; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 17f, 
79; Milliken, Jennifer 1995, p. 229; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 23, 38, 63 
65 Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 87, 94f, 103, 110f, 150; see also Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 212 
66
 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 13, 26f; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 103; Wight, Colin 1999; Bieler, 
Andreas & Morton, Adam David 2001 
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therefore often gradual and it usually involves conflict and struggle.
67
 Stability should 
not, however, be viewed as „natural‟, rather, it is a result of active reproduction and 
exclusion of alternative representations through discursive and social practices. As 
such, instances of consensus, discursive stability, and dominance are interesting from a 
discourse analytic perspective.
68
  
2.1.7 Intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
These two terms are useful for understanding and analyzing both the potential for 
discursive change in concrete articulations, and discourses‟ considerable inertia. The 
latter is developed by the linguist Norman Fairclough; the former originates from 
Mikhail Bhaktin and has been used by other linguists, for example Julia Kristeva.
69
 
Here, I mainly draw on Fairclough‟s use of the terms.70 
Intertextuality means that all texts (understood as all concrete instances of language 
use) draws on, refers to, and interpret existing and previously formulated texts.
71
 Texts 
are thus connected to other texts through references and shared elements. They 
respond to, reformulate, and rework other texts, changing the way these texts are 
understood.
72
  
Being constructed on the basis of other texts, all texts may therefore be viewed as 
heterogeneous mosaics containing contradictions and ambivalence. As such, they carry 
in them potential for change and innovation. Innovation happens when existing texts 
are combined in new ways, creating new perspectives and understandings.
73
 The 
potential for innovation inherent in the production and interpretation of all texts is, 
                                            
67 Neumann, Iver B. 2001, p. 133, see also pp. 60, 102, 143; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 14, 22, 
67-71; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 128-131, 145ff, 214. Hansen gives a practical example of discourse resilience through 
showing that the British discourse on the Bosnian war was remarkably resilient in face of events that apparently 
challenged it.  
68 Doty, Roxanne Lynn 1997, p. 378; Friis, Karsten 2007; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 7f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, 
Louise 1999, pp. 20f, 39f, 144; Milliken, Jennifer 1999, pp. 230, 242; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 53,133 
69 For an introduction to Kristeva’s understanding of the term, see Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 55-72. Here, I draw mainly on 
Fairclough’s understanding of the term as laid out in Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999 
70 More specifically, I draw on the presentation of  Fairclough’s terminology in Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, 
Louise 1999  
71 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 84; Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 20f, 40f 
72 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 55, 148-178, 216. Hansen exemplifies the power of new texts to change the meaning of older 
texts by showing that two widely referred texts on Balkan, Robert D. Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts and Rebecca West’s Black 
Lamb and Grey Falcon, changed meaning as they were interpreted anew in the context of the Bosnian war. 
73 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 55f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 83ff 
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however, by no means unlimited. The existing discourse(s) limit the possibilities for 
new combinations of texts and what texts can legitimately be drawn upon.
74
  
Interdiscursivity may be seen as a specific variant of intertextuality. It concerns the 
actualization and combination of different discourses or representations in one 
articulation.
75
 Inclusion of resources and representations that originally belong to 
another discourse and social domain widens the repertoire of discursive resources that 
may be drawn upon in subsequent articulations. Such innovative interdiscursive 
practices thus work to widen and change discourses, and their construction of reality.
76
  
When analyzing texts in the Norwegian peace engagement discourse, investigating the 
aspect of intertextuality may enable us to locate continuities in the discourse by 
specifying how previous texts inform the present one and what texts are 
conventionally referred to. It also allows us to uncover innovative discursive practice, 
that is, instances of unconventional references or new combinations of texts. The same 
is true for interdiscursivity; identifying innovative combinations of and references to 
discourses may take us a long way towards specifying the characteristics of a specific 
discourse and reveal how discourses are constructed and changed. As such, 
investigating intertextuality and interdiscursivity allows us to trace the production, 
reproduction, and development of the peace engagement discourse.  
2.2 A Discourse Analytic Methodology  
Generally, discourse analytic literature has tended to focus on meta-theory and theory, 
thus neglecting the level of methodology and failing to specify how analysis may be 
carried out in practice. However, the importance of methodology for producing 
transparent, rigorous, empirically based, and well organized studies has recently been 
put to the fore.
77
 Focusing on the reliability of the studies, clearly specifying the 
                                            
74 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 8, 55f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 85 
75 Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 83f 
76 Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 324f; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 83f 
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 Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2006, pp. 14-18; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. xviii-xix (Preface); Jørgensen, Marianne Winther & Phillips, 
Louise 1999; Milliken, Jennifer 1999 (particularly pp. 226ff, 235f); Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 13ff 
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research design, the basis for the knowledge claims set forth, and how results have 
been obtained, is now seen as a prerequisite for scholarly legitimacy.
78
   
In this section, I present the methodology and approach of this study, specifying the 
nature and scope of my analysis, what kind of empirical material is included, what 
kind of analytical concepts and tools I will use, and what I will focus on. 
2.2.1 The nature of the study, and its empirical material 
As laid out in the introduction chapter, this study is built around a broad analysis of the 
Norwegian peace engagement discourse. I analyze empirical material from the late 
1980s and up to 2008, aiming at including as broad a selection of texts as possible. The 
scope of the thesis prevents me from analyzing the „prehistory‟ of the Norwegian 
peace engagement. I have chosen to focus on the period from the revelation of 
Norway‟s role in the Middle East peace process in 1993, and up to today. In principle, 
all texts concerning or commenting upon the Norwegian peace engagement is thus 
relevant. However, it is not possible to study the discourse in its totality. There are two 
reasons for this. First, it is simply not possible to find all texts that are potentially 
relevant. Some texts, like Government White Papers on foreign policy, and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs‟ Foreign Policy Addresses to the Storting, are readily 
available and easily identified as part of the discourse. Other texts, and particularly 
newspaper articles, may be much more difficult to identify as part of the discourse and 
to obtain. Second, the number of potentially relevant texts and the extent of the 
material are enormous. Carrying out a proper discourse analysis requires us to conduct 
a relatively detailed and in-depth reading of the texts that is used, and it is therefore 
simply an insurmountable task to read and analyze everything. We can thus never be 
absolutely certain that we do not miss anything with significance for the analysis; texts 
that are not included in the material may articulate unidentified representations or 
other discursive innovations that would have a bearing on the results.
79
  
                                            
78 Hansen, Lene 2006, p. 45; Jørgensen, Marianne Winther & Phillips, Louise 1999, p. 168. Hansen also stresses that some 
readings are better than others, and that reliable studies have to be based on explicit discursive articulations of signs and 
identities, include all important signs, pay careful attention to the linking and juxtaposition of signs, to how signs 
constructs Selves and Others, and how they legitimize particular policies. 
79 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 85f; Neumann, B. Iver 2001, pp. 53ff 
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With these caveats in mind, I nevertheless try to include as wide and broad body of 
texts as possible. Ideally, and according to Lene Hansen, an analysis of foreign policy 
discourse would include texts expressing the official position; texts emanating from 
the political opposition, corporate structures, and the media; scientific or scholarly 
texts; texts produced in the context of popular culture; and texts expressing marginal 
political positions.
80
 Such a broad approach would ensure that we do not miss or 
exclude marginal representations. 
In this study, I include texts emanating from the government (texts expressing the 
official position, that is); texts from the political opposition; texts appearing in the 
media; and some scholarly texts.
81
 However, I generally do not analyze the different 
kinds of texts separately, like Hansen seems to suggest.
82
 When reading through the 
empirical material, it became apparent that there were no clear boundaries between the 
different kinds of texts; a majority of the texts from the political opposition for 
example articulate the dominant representation. The presentation of the analysis is 
therefore structured on the basis of the representations, not on the basis of type of text. 
The official texts include Government White Papers on foreign policy and 
development aid; the Minster of Foreign Affairs‟ yearly Foreign Policy Addresses to 
the Storting
83; reports and articles from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs‟ web pages; 
and other relevant official documents such as official reports, policy frameworks, 
speeches, and newspaper articles written by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or State 
Secretaries. Taken together, this constitutes the largest part of the material, covering 
most official texts that are relevant and publicly available.  
The texts from the political opposition are mainly from the Parliamentary Proceedings. 
All the debates on the Minister of Foreign Affairs‟ Foreign Policy Addresses are 
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 Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 59-64, 73f. Lene Hansen develops three intertextual models to be utilized in discourse analysis. 
Model 1 includes the official discourse only, Model 2 adds the wider political debate, Model 3A adds cultural 
representations, and Model 3B adds marginal political discourses and scholarly analyses. An analysis including all the 
elements mentioned here is in line with Hansen’s Model 3, and has a very broad analytic scope. 
81 In Hansen’s terminology, I conduct a Model 2 or Model 3B analysis. Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. 59-64, 73f 
82 Ibid, pp. 59-64, 73ff. 
83 The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs traditionally delivers one general Foreign Policy Address to the Storting each 
year. This address, together with the subsequent Stortinget debate and the relevant White Papers, form the basis for 
Norwegian foreign policy. For an interesting discourse analytic analysis of the practice of address production in the 
Norwegian MFA, see Neumann, Iver B. 2001, pp. 135-152 
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included, and so are debates and Committee Recommendations on the relevant White 
Papers. I have also included relevant newspaper articles emanating from the political 
opposition.   
The included media texts are newspaper articles exclusively. Almost all these articles 
have been found using the largest Norwegian newspaper database, Atekst.
84
 I have 
also searched the web using search engines such as Google and Sesam, to include 
sources that may not be included in Atekst, and used academic literature on the peace 
engagement to identify interesting articles.
85
 However, a lot of newspaper articles, 
particularly from the early 1990s, are simply not available online, and they have thus 
not been included in the analysis.  
When searching for articles, I have used keywords like „Norway‟, „peace‟, 
„engagement‟, „peace nation‟, „peace talks‟, „peace agreement‟, „peace diplomacy‟, 
„humanitarian great power‟, „foreign policy‟, „Middle East‟, „Guatemala‟, „Sri Lanka‟, 
„Colombia‟ (the most well-known peace processes Norway has been involved in); the 
names of central actors, such as Jan Egeland, Kjell Magne Bondevik, and the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs; and a variety of combinations thereof.
86
 This should, in theory, get 
me most of the relevant newspaper articles in the databases. It should be noted, 
however, that such a search may easily miss articles that do not use the words and 
terminology I have based the search on. Moreover, some searches yield so massive a 
number of hits that it simply is impossible to include all the articles in the analysis.
87
 I 
have, in such cases, chosen articles on the basis of their apparent relevance.   
Lastly, I have also included some texts written by academics, particularly from the 
2003 to 2008 period. Most of these texts are newspaper articles, but there are also 
some scholarly studies in the empirical material. The scope of this thesis prevents me 
from conducting a thorough discourse analysis of academic texts on the peace 
                                            
84
 It should be noted that although Atekst has a comprehensive archive, it does not cover all the major newspapers in the 
early 1990s. Verdens Gang  and Aftenposten are included in the entire period under investigation here; Dagbladet is 
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engagement. When I nevertheless have included some academic texts, I have done so 
because of their apparent influence on the discourse, and their position as points of 
reference for other kinds of texts. 
With such an extensive empirical material, it is not possible to analyze each and every 
text in detail. This thesis rather aims at giving a broad overview of the discourse, 
identifying all the representations therein, and tracing their evolution over time. It thus 
covers the discourse‟s historical development, maintaining sensitivity to the temporal 
dimension.
88
 I systematize and categorize all the texts according to what concepts, 
notions and links they articulate, and thus what representation they draw on. This 
quantitative classification of the general textual material allows me to assess the 
strength of the different representations, and what concepts and links are central.  
I also pick some pieces of text for more detailed analysis. These are selected because 
they appear as central, are frequently referred to by other texts, appear as 
representative for a position or representation, and/or clearly articulate central 
concepts and discursive constructions.
89
 It should be noted that the vast majority of my 
empirical material is in Norwegian. The quotes I present are therefore translated to 
English. I have chosen to maintain the Norwegian sentence structure as far as possible, 
because this structure according to discourse analysis may carry meaning. The 
translations may therefore sound a bit strange in English. 
2.2.2 On events 
So far, my discussion of empirical material for analysis has concerned texts 
exclusively. However, a proper discourse analysis also must also incorporate practice, 
and it must be sensitive to the influence of events. The goal is to incorporate texts, 
discourse and practice in one single account, highlighting their mutual constitution.
90
  
The discourse analytic literature is mainly focused on analyzing texts and discourses, 
and the tools developed primarily lend themselves to textual analysis. Despite the lack 
of methodologically sound tools, it is possible to remain sensitive to the influence of 
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(non-discursive) practice and events on the discourse. In her study of the Western 
discourse on the Bosnian War, Lene Hansen takes events into consideration and shows 
how they in some instances put pressure on the dominant discourses, necessitated 
responses, and thereby induced discursive changes.
91
 However, Hansen also underlines 
that events should not be viewed as extra-discursive, external influences. The extent to 
which events are constructed by discourses are underlined:  
Tracing the evolution of discursive constructions over time involves (…) an examination 
of how key events are responded to by official foreign policy discourse. These events do 
not exist in and of themselves, but are constituted as events by governing political bodies, 
oppositional parties and groups, international institutions, and the news media, yet once 
established they have the potential to destabilize existing discourses.
92
 
In other words; events and facts exist in and by themselves, but they have no particular 
meaning and salience for us until they are inserted into and situated within one or more 
existing discourses. Events and facts are not accessible to us outside of discourse, and 
discourses form the basis on which they are interpreted.
93
 The process of insertion and 
situation is not automatic, however; it depends on agency. Moreover, once facts and 
events become established, they may challenge the existing discourses.
94
  
In this study, I will mainly focus on textual analysis that aims at identifying 
representations and their distinguishing characteristics, and at showing how discourse 
and representations work and what they do. However, I will incorporate foreign policy 
practices and events where we can reasonably expect them to be influential. I will also 
examine whether events that have been constituted as important or salient in the 
foreign policy discourse have led to discursive change.
95
 In this respect, the event of 
the Middle East peace process stands out; its discursive construction and fundamental 
importance for the peace engagement discourse is analyzed in detail. 
2.2.3 Delimiting discourse and representations 
In all discourse analyses, identification and delimitation of discourses and 
representations are crucial; they are the basis for discussing what discourses and 
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representations do and how they work in concrete cases. The criteria we use in the 
identification and delimitation process must therefore be explicitly laid out. 
In the theory part of the chapter, I define both discourse and representation.
96
 
However, the definitions give few guidelines for identification and delimitation. 
Neumann underlines that identification and delimitation must be defended as 
reasonable in each case, and that correspondence with the actual discursive terrain is 
important.
97
 On the other hand, the research question and the object of the study 
clearly influence what is usefully seen as discourse and representation. They may be 
identified at different levels of specificity, and the level chosen depends not only on 
the empirical material at hand but also on the analytical needs of the researcher. 
General guidelines for the delimitation of discourses are hence difficult to establish.
98
 
Jørgensen & Phillips and Lene Hansen suggest that discourses and representations 
may be viewed analytical tools constructed to frame the research, and that they 
therefore are analytically delimited.
99
  
Identification and delimitation of discourses will, in other words, impose some order 
on the textual material, but it is crucial that this order is reasonable and takes the 
textual material as its starting point. It should therefore not be done a priori; rather, it is 
done after a thorough reading.
100
 Representations that are unexpected, partly hidden or 
articulated in only some texts may therefore be identified and brought into the 
analysis. 
Discourses and representations are analytically established and delimited on the basis 
of the patterns and structures found in the texts. More specifically, the process of 
identification may take as its starting point the capacity of discourses and 
representations to structure and pattern both our utterances and our thinking. 
Discourses and representations necessarily leave an imprint on the texts they are found 
in, and precisely by identifying particularly salient discursive constructions (nodal 
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points and links) and the meanings they establish in the textual material, we may thus 
identify and delimit them.  
In most cases it is possible and useful to identify several representations that partly 
cover the same domain, try to impose meaning on the same concepts, and thus 
compete. By identifying competing representations, rather than one monolithic and all-
encompassing discourse, the aspects of discursive conflict and instability are 
emphasized.
101
 When identifying several distinct and competing representations, we 
want to capture the main structural positions within the debate. The representations 
identified should be clearly differentiated; they should use different expressions and 
terminologies, impose different meanings on things, draw on and construct different 
identities, and differ in the positions they take. Moreover, explicit articulations of key 
positions and identities should be the basis for the identification.
102
  
Analyzing how the discourse and the representations therein have developed, evolved, 
and changed is a central part of this study. When reading and analyzing the texts, I 
thus aim at maintaining sensitivity to the temporal dimension, and to present 
representations as dynamic rather than static structures.
103
 Moreover, contemporary 
discourses and representations, and the key concepts they draw on, always have a 
prehistory. Ideally, this should be traced. Within the confines of this study, I am not 
able to study the history prior to the late 1980s of the relevant discourses and 
representations. I therefore draw on already existing conceptual histories and discourse 
analyses. Halvard Leira‟s studies are a very useful source for the history of the peace 
engagement discourse.
104
 Similarly, I draw on Bjørn Arne Steine & Carl Emil Vogt‟s 
study of the historical Norwegian peace tradition, on Carl Emil Vogt‟s study on the 
importance of Fridtjof Nansen in this tradition
105
, and on Terje Tvedt‟s studies of the 
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Norwegian „South-political system‟106. I also utilize general scholarly literature on 
Norwegian foreign policy and aid policy.
107
 The chapter on the „prehistory‟ of the 
peace engagement discourse draws heavily on these secondary sources. 
2.2.4 Analytical framework 
On the basis of the above theoretical and methodological considerations, an analytical 
framework that will inform the empirical analysis throughout may now be outlined. I 
have chosen to organize the analysis on the basis of a periodization based on a 
preliminary reading of the empirical material and my impression of the discourse 
therein. The periodization is in other words grounded. This implies that each period I 
identify has some distinct characteristics setting it apart from the other periods in terms 
of the discourse and the representations therein, and that these characteristics are 
relevant from a discourse analytic perspective. When constructing the periodization, I 
have focused on discursive characteristics such as the peace discourse‟s relation to 
other discourses, the stability of the discourse, the articulated representations, 
discursive constructions constituting the representations, and the meaning of and links 
between key terms or nodal points. Although arguably carefully grounded in the 
empirical material, the periods should be seen as analytical tools that help structure my 
account, and not as objective categories that exist independently of the analysis.  It 
should also be noted that there are many continuities in the discourse, and that the 
periods therefore are quite open ended.   
On the basis of the discourse, I distinguish between these four distinct periods: 
 Up to 1993. The peace engagement discourse‟s „prehistory‟ 
The signing of the Oslo Accords, and the subsequent attention to Norwegian 
facilitation for the peace process, marks the end of this period.  
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 1993-1997. The establishment of a distinct peace engagement discourse, a 
dominant representation and one alternative representation in the wake of the 
revelation of Norway‟s role in the Middle East Peace process. 
 1997-2003. The consolidation of the discourse, its dominant representation, and 
the related practices. The emergence of a second alternative representation. 
 2003-2008. The discourse is opened, discursive struggle ensues. The discourse 
takes a reflexive turn, the alternative representations gain in strength, and the 
official representation is reproduced and mobilized in response.  
Within each period, I identify the discursive structures and patterns in the texts under 
study. In other words, I look for discursive constructions that are reproduced, nodal 
points, and floating signifiers. Key terms/ nodal points are defined as terms, concepts 
or notions that appear as nodes in the conceptual web of the discourse; privileged signs 
around which the discourse revolves and that other signs get their meaning in relation 
to.
108
 They will therefore often appear as particularly salient concepts, and they are 
thus relatively easily identified and mapped. Because texts articulating the same 
representation will often draw on the same key terms, link them in a similar fashion, 
and thus inscribe them with similar meaning, such a mapping is very useful when 
identifying and constructing representations. Moreover, analyzing the meaning of key 
terms at different points in time also enable us to trace discursive evolution. If we find 
that the meaning of a key term has changed, or that some key terms disappear and 
others become prominent, we have ample evidence of change. 
Identifying floating signifiers is done in much the same way as identifying key terms, 
but the focus is on terms that are ambiguous and filled with different meanings in 
different texts. The existence of floating signifiers therefore indicates discursive 
conflict and lack of discursive hegemony; it is interpreted as a result of different 
representations competing to fill a term with content and meaning. Identifying floating 
                                            
108
 Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina 2005, pp. 315-318; Jørgensen, Marianne Winter & Phillips, Louise 1999, pp. 35-40; 
see also section on ‘Representations as relationally structured systems of signs’ 
28 
 
signifiers therefore allows us to distinguish between competing representations, and to 
identify potential discursive changes.
109
  
I also remain sensitive to the intertextual and interdiscursive aspects of texts.
110
 
Mapping these aspects thoroughly is simply not possible within the confines of this 
thesis, but the concepts may nevertheless be employed in a less ambitious way, in the 
analysis of continuity and change. This implies that we note the degree to which a 
given text differs from others in terms of links to existing articulations and discourses. 
If we find unusual or innovative links or interpretations, it indicates discursive 
change.
111
 I will thus use the concepts when they seem to capture important aspects of 
the discursive evolution.  
On the basis of these analytical tools, the analysis aims to show what position peace 
and peace promotion had in the foreign policy and development aid discourses prior to 
the Oslo Agreement, how the peace engagement discourse was established as a distinct 
discourse with certain key terms and floating signifiers, how it related to and drew on 
already existing discourses, how different representations were established and 
reproduced, and what signs and concepts the representations were organized around. 
Throughout, I will focus on continuities and changes in the discourse, tracing its 
evolution and assessing its stability. The effects of the discourse will also be assessed; 
how the discourse has naturalized and legitimized the Norwegian practice of peace 
promotion, how it has defined certain actions as appropriate and excluded others, and 
how it has contributed to the establishment and maintenance of peace promotion as 
one of the main pillars of Norway‟s foreign policy. I will also touch upon the issue of 
identities, suggesting what identities and self images the discourse and its 
representations have inscribed Norway with. 
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3 The Prehistory of the Peace Engagement Discourse: 
up to 1993 
In this section, the historical Norwegian „peace tradition‟ and peace discourse is 
briefly presented, and the position of peace and peace promotion within the official 
foreign policy and development aid discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
analyzed. I focus on identifying discursive resources; key terms, concepts, and 
meanings; that existed in these discourses and that could be drawn on by the peace 
engagement discourse when it came into being.  
3.1 The Norwegian Peace Discourse and Peace Tradition 
At the outset, it should be noted that „peace‟ is a concept with a particular resonance in 
the Norwegian society. It has been firmly established that Norway has a distinct peace 
tradition that reaches back at least to the 1890s, before Norway got its 
independence.
112
 „Peace‟ was indeed a crucial concept in the political mobilization that 
ultimately led to the break-away from Sweden. It consequently came to dominate the 
foreign policy discourse of the newborn state. Peace was established as the primary 
goal of Norwegian foreign policy, and neutrality as the main tool.
113
 
Peace remained an organizing concept in Norwegian foreign policy discourse after 
World War I. Fridtjof Nansen‟s highly regarded aid to refugees and famine-stricken 
people in the Soviet Union were instrumental in this respect; humanitarianism was 
adopted as part of the peace discourse and has remained an important concept ever 
since. References to the „legacy from Nansen‟ are commonplace, also in contemporary 
peace discourse.
114
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The peace discourse also remained important in the years prior to the outbreak of 
World War II. However, its policy implications changed. Where it had inspired a 
proactive Norwegian role in international cooperation and conflict prevention in the 
1920s, it was used as an argument for neutrality in the 1930s. Despite these policy 
changes, the peace discourse remained largely intact. It was, in other words, flexible in 
terms of policy implications.
115
 Halvard Leira also states that the discourse, although 
not as pervasive, dominant and visible as earlier, continued to inform Norway‟s 
foreign policy during the Cold War. The strong support for the UN, the importance 
attached to international law, the development aid, the efforts in humanitarian 
assistance, and the substantial participation in UN peacekeeping operations may all 
plausibly be seen as practices inspired by the peace discourse.
116
  
Although the continuity of the Norwegian peace discourse has not been subject to 
detailed discourse analytic studies
117
, Leira suggests that the peace tradition and the 
related discourse has remained an important influence on Norwegian foreign policy 
thinking throughout the 20
th
 century.
118
 Olav Riste, although not adopting a discourse 
analytic perspective, similarly underlines the „missionary impulse‟ and the wish to be a 
frontrunner in the issue areas of international justice and humanitarian values as 
important and stable motive forces in Norwegian foreign policy.
119
 Riste also captures 
a distinct feature of general Norwegian foreign policy discourse: the emphasis on 
Norway‟s special role in peace and human rights promotion. Indeed, a Norwegian 
exceptionalism, underlining Norway‟s distinct qualities and abilities, appears to be an 
important part of Norway‟s identity and self image.120  
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3.2 Discourse Prior to 1993 
Within the confines of this thesis, it is not possible to conduct a thorough investigation 
of the discourse prior to 1993. I have thus chosen to focus on the official foreign 
policy and development aid discourses as articulated in relevant White Papers. One 
academic study is also included due to its apparent influence: Jan Egeland‟s “Impotent 
Superpower – Potent Small State”. 
3.2.1 Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State: Norway’s foreign policy 
potential 
In 1988, Jan Egeland published his study “Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State. 
Potentials and Limitations of Human Rights Objectives in the Foreign Policies of the 
United States and Norway.”121 Its central thesis is that Norway as a small state in 
certain circumstances may be a more effective human rights advocate on the 
international scene than the US.
122
  
The argument behind this claim proceeds in two steps. First, Egeland focuses on 
Norway‟s positive international image as a precondition for effective human rights 
advocacy. First, Norway has “no legacy of foreign excesses” such as colonialism, 
imperialism and interventionism.  Second, it has a good domestic human rights record. 
Third, it has a high level of foreign aid. Fourth, Norway has actively supported 
decolonization processes and national liberation.
 123
 It should be noted that Egeland‟s 
thesis on this point draws heavily on and establishes intertextual links to former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Frydenlund‟s book on Norway‟s international 
challenges from 1982. Frydenlund here articulates very similar notions.
124
  
Egeland then turns to structural preconditions, arguing that Norway is very well 
equipped as a human rights advocate in this respect: 
The potentials for Norway as an important entrepreneur for international human rights 
lies (sic) in the existence of three of the four suggested preconditions: policy consensus, 
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few conflicting foreign policy interests, and increasing funds for foreign assistance. The 
fourth criteria (sic), which is only poorly covered, institutional memory, is one which 
may be remedied through the build-up of domestic expertise.
125
 
From the perspective of this thesis, Egeland‟s book is interesting for a number of 
reasons. First, by articulating the construction of Norway‟s international image as 
positive, the book invests it with academic legitimacy, actualizes it, and thereby 
strengthens the concept of Norwegian exceptionalism.
126
 Second, Norway is portrayed 
as a state with clear advantages and unexploited potentials in human rights advocacy. 
Third, the study explicitly lays out the factors enabling Norway to play such a role. 
Finally, Egeland presents an agenda for the future that in effect is a program for further 
improvements in Norway‟s potential. It focuses on capacity and expertise building and 
closer cooperation between the state, the NGOs and the academic institutions.
127
 
Because Egeland later became State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
one of the main architects behind Norway‟s activist peace promotion policy, this 
program is noteworthy. So are the concepts he articulates; although they concern 
human rights advocacy and not peace promotion, they seem compatible with activist 
peace engagement as well.  
3.2.2 Official and authoritative discourse: White Papers 
In the period prior to 1993, the government presented three White Papers concerning 
foreign policy and development aid. Analyzing their treatment of peace and peace 
promotion gives us a picture of how these issues were discursively constructed prior to 
the emergence of the activist peace promotion policy.   
In the 1987 White Paper on development aid and relations to the global South, peace 
promotion is established as one of five intermediate aims of Norwegian development 
aid.
128
 However, no explicit strategy for peace promotion is devised, and the issue is 
hardly discussed at all.
129
 It is stated that Norway may use development aid funding to 
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support local peace initiatives, but no active role for Norway is envisioned.
130
 Norway 
is thus established as a passive rather than an active contributor. 
The 1989 White Paper is a comprehensive overview of Norwegian foreign relations.
131
 
Its stated aim is to devise a foreign policy which attends to Norway‟s interests. 
However, these interests are defined broadly to include not only interests that are 
specific to Norway, but also “global common interests” shared by all.132 Moreover, 
and despite the interest focus, the text also ascertains that the Norwegian policy is 
value based.
133
 
The White Paper‟s treatment of Norway‟s global engagement to help people in crisis is 
also notable. It is seen as springing from values, but it is also underlined that it is 
“important to safeguard our own security and prosperity.”134 The text repeatedly 
articulates the position that security cannot be viewed in isolation from global 
challenges.
135
 The definition of security set forth is thus comprehensive. Such a notion 
of security was, at the time, innovative, and the White Paper introduced it to the 
official Norwegian foreign policy discourse.
136
  
It is also striking that the White Paper states that Norway, despite its status as a small 
state, may be an international frontrunner in issue areas where it has experience, 
traditions, resources and competence.
137
 Being a small, homogenous state with 
substantial political consensus and no colonial past or great power liabilities, is 
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considered an advantage in certain issue areas.
138
 Promotion of peace is, interestingly 
enough, not considered an area where Norway has particular advantages.
139
 The White 
Paper thus gives few „early warnings‟ of the peace promotion activism of the 1990s. 
The 1992 White Paper on North-South relations and Norwegian development aid was 
produced and presented after Norway got involved in the Guatemalan peace process, 
but before the Oslo Channel and the Middle East peace process were established. To a 
large extent, it reproduces the 1989 White Paper‟s positions on peace and peace 
promotion and the concepts it employs. The comprehensive notion of security and the 
mutual dependence of the world‟s states and peoples are repeatedly articulated.140 
Although helping the developing countries is also motivated by ethics of duty, respect 
for the human rights, and international solidarity,
141
 the self interest perspective is 
prominent. Idealism and self interests are thus seen as pulling in the same direction.
142
 
Despite the focus on security, peace and peace promotion are not treated as pivotal 
parts of the Norwegian development policy.
143
 Furthermore, peace promotion is not 
seen as one of the areas where Norway has particular competence and traditions. It is 
generally constructed as a sub-category of humanitarian assistance and democracy 
promotion and subsumed under the sections treating these issues.
144
 In discourse 
analytic terminology, peace promotion is not a nodal point or privileged sign within 
the discourse, it is a subordinate sign.  
However, the 1992 White Paper does seem to point towards peace promotion 
becoming more important: 
Because stability and peace is a precondition for development to take place, the 
Government thinks that Norway should contribute to the largest extent possible to 
prevent and abate conflicts in the South. Such contributions may come in the form of 
peace promoting efforts, cooperation across boundaries, defense of democracy and 
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human rights, negotiation efforts, and peacekeeping operations by the UN. (…) 
Norwegian government officials, non-governmental organizations and academic 
institutions have participated in negotiation efforts and confidence-building measures 
in different parts of the world, including the Horn of Africa and Central America.
145
  
This can be read as pointing in the direction of more substantial engagement in peace 
promotion. Stability and peace are constructed as preconditions for development, and 
it follows that Norway should contribute to reducing conflicts.
146
 In line with this, the 
White Paper treats support for peace as an important future focus, and it suggests that 
conflict prevention and reduction should be integrated in the development strategy.
147
 
In contrast to the previous White Papers, peace promotion is thus seen as an integral 
part of the Norwegian development aid and foreign policy. Although little is said about 
means and strategies, Norway is established as an actor that may contribute to peace, 
at least in some circumstances. It is also underlined that the experiences with peace 
building so far have been positive enough to warrant further efforts.  
3.3 Summary 
The peace engagement discourse that developed after the signing of the Oslo Accords 
in the autumn of 1993 did not come out of nowhere. The existence of a historical 
peace discourse and peace tradition, and the positive link between peace and 
Norwegian foreign policy articulated therein, almost certainly eased the establishment 
of the peace engagement discourse as a central foreign policy discourse in the 1990s. 
Both the historical peace discourse and the foreign policy and development aid 
discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s provided discursive resources (key terms, 
concepts, links, and meanings) on which the peace engagement discourse later would 
draw heavily. The Norwegian exceptionalism, the positive assessments of Norway‟s 
ability to contribute to the solution of global challenges, the comprehensive notion of 
security, the compatibility of self interests and altruism, and the link between 
development and peace are notable in this respect.  
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supports peace initiatives in a growing number of countries, including Guatemala, Ethiopia/ Eritrea, Sri Lanka, and Sudan 
146
 See also Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992, p. 176 
147 Ibid, pp. 22, 26, 57 
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It is also noteworthy that the newest White Paper, published in 1992, is the one that 
focuses the most on peace promotion. This may be seen as indicating a starting peace 
engagement.  However, peace and peace engagement are far from being privileged 
signs or concepts around which the discourse is organized. They are rather subsumed 
under the heading of development aid or humanitarian assistance, and they are thus 
subordinate concepts in the development aid and foreign policy discourses. Peace 
promotion is indeed treated as a tool in development aid. In other words: there exists 
no distinct peace engagement discourse in the period here investigated, that is, before 
Norway‟s role in the Middle East peace process between the Israel and Palestine 
became publicly known.                              
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4 The Establishment of a Distinct Peace Engagement 
Discourse and a Dominant Representation: 1993-1997 
In this chapter, I present and discuss what I view as the emergence and establishment 
of a distinct discourse centered on the Norwegian peace engagement. I start by 
analyzing the newspaper coverage‟s discursive construction of the Middle East peace 
process. The concepts, links, and meanings that appear as central are outlined, and I 
argue that the resulting discursive construction is of paramount importance in bringing 
the Norwegian peace promotion activism to the fore and strengthening it.
148
 It should 
be noted that the media scene appears as an arena for official discourse rather than an 
autonomous arena; government officials are often the primary sources of information 
and assessments appearing in newspaper articles.
149
 The resulting dominance of the 
official version of the event may be seen as paving the way for the establishment of a 
dominant representation of the peace engagement. 
The next part of the chapter analyzes this dominant representation and its inscription in 
official and authoritative discourse. I present its key terms, discursive constructions, 
and the meanings it establishes, and analyze its reproduction in texts emanating from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, I present an emerging alternative 
representation that criticizes the lack of prioritization of national interests in Norway‟s 
foreign policy, and claims that the emphasis on the peace engagement is part of the 
cause of this neglect.   
4.1 The Media Coverage of the Oslo Agreement 
Studying the media coverage in its entirety is not possible within the confines of this 
thesis. I have chosen to focus on newspapers.
150
 The extent of the Norwegian 
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 For similar views on the importance of the Middle East peace process (not grounded on discourse analysis), see 
Butenschøn, Nils A. 1997, pp. 371, 386; Liland, Frode & Kjerland, Kristen Alsaker 2003, p. 95; Riste, Olav 2001, pp. 272; 
Tamnes, Rolf 1997, pp. 444ff  
149 For a related analysis of the lack of media autonomy from the authorities in the areas of development assistance and 
South policy, see Tvedt, Terje 2003, particularly pp. 199-235 
150 The material includes articles from Norwegian News Agency, two newspapers with nationwide distribution (Verdens 
Gang, in the following the abbreviation VG is used; and Aftenposten), and two regional newspapers (Bergens Tidende and 
Nordlys). These are the biggest newspapers whose articles from 1992 and onwards are included Atekst 
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involvement in the peace process between Israel and PLO, and the secret back channel 
through which the negotiations had proceeded, became publicly known in Norway 29- 
30. August, 1993.  Also prior to this it was generally known that Norway was 
involved
151, but the revelation of the „Oslo Back Channel‟, the „Oslo Agreement‟, and 
Norway‟s considerable role in the negotiations nevertheless sparked massive media 
attention. In the body of texts concerning the „Oslo Agreement‟ that I have analyzed, 
certain concepts, links, and meanings stand out and are repeated, thus assuming 
importance in the discourse. These are presented below. 
4.1.1 Norway has played a decisive role in the successful negotiations 
This discursive construction is articulated explicitly in the vast majority of the articles. 
The words used differ slightly, but the basic position expressed is the same throughout: 
Norway‟s contribution was important or decisive for the positive outcome of the 
negotiations.  
When revelations about Norwegian contributions to a secret negotiation channel 
started to leak out, VG stated that Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen Holst‟s 
and State Secretary Jan Egeland‟s meetings with the parties to the Middle East conflict 
“confirms the impression that Norway has a central role in the new developments in 
the peace talks.”152 Later, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland153 and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen Holst
154
 gave statements underlining Norway‟s role and 
importance.  
What is notable about these articulations is that they all build on and refer directly to 
official sources. The authority of the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
State Secretary, and the two latter‟s direct participation in the process, strongly 
supports the legitimacy and authority of the view that Norway has played an important 
                                            
151 See for example Aftenposten Morgen 1992 (28 Jun.); Aftenposten Aften 1993a (20 Aug.); NTBtekst 1992 (18 Aug.) 
152 VG 1993a (29 Aug.) 
153
 NTBtekst 1993a (30 Aug.) 
154 Aftenposten Morgen 1993a (30 Aug.); Aftenposten Morgen 1993c (31 Aug.); VG 1993b (30 Aug.)  
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role. The majority of the subsequent articles concerning the peace process repeat this 
position.
155
 VG says it this way:  
The Norwegian invitation [to meetings in Norway] not only created the historical peace 
plan between Israel and PLO. Egeland‟s invitation also created a historical and decisive 
cooperation between Israel‟s two leading politicians, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres.
156
  
Aftenposten Aften states that “(…) Holst & Co did what Kissinger never 
accomplished: To create peace in the Middle East powder keg.”157 And an Aftenposten 
editorial named “Historic” concludes that “Without shyness, we can establish that with 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen Holst at the forefront, Norway really has 
lived up to the role as frontrunner and bridge builder.”158 
Related to this assessment of the Norwegian role is another common discursive 
element: Norway gets international praise for its efforts.
159
 Article headlines like 
“Clinton praises Norway‟s effort”160, “Jagland gets Israeli praise for Norwegian 
negotiation efforts”161, “Norway praised from all quarters”162, and “Norway again 
praised for its active role”163 are telling in this respect. Most of the articles cite an 
international leader praising Norway for its contributions. Bergens Tidende reports 
that “the world is indebted to Norway, said the American President Bill Clinton”164. 
Also the Palestinian and Israeli parties, and professional peace promoter Jimmy Carter, 
reportedly value the Norwegian contribution highly: “When Yasser Arafat, Shimon 
                                            
155For explicit articulations of this position, see Aftenposten Morgen 1993e (10 Sept.); Aftenposten Morgen 1993g (19 
Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993a (11 Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993b (11 Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993d (30 Oct); Bergens 
Tidende 1993f (31 Dec.); Nordlys 1993a (7 Sept.); Nordlys 1993b (11 Sept.); NTBtekst 1993g (14 Sept.); VG 1993c (1 Sept.); 
VG 1993d (2 Sept.); VG 1993e (6 Sept.); VG 1993g (13 Sept.), VG 1993h (29 Sept.). I have found only one article expressly 
arguing for another view; namely that that Norway only has played a supporting role. See Aftenposten Morgen 1993d (1 
Sept.). Aftenposten Morgen 1993h (29 Sept.) quotes Jan Egeland saying that we must not exaggerate Norway’s role and 
contribution, but the rest of the article focuses on Norway’s comparative advantages in peace promotion. 
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 VG 1993d (2 Sept); see also VG 1993e (6 Sept).  
157 Aftenposten Aften 1994 (25 May); for a similar statement, see Bergens Tidende 1993a (11 Sept.) 
158 Aftenposten 1993e (10 Sept.) 
159
 Aftenposten Morgen 1993f (11 Sept.); Aftenposten Morgen 1993g (19 Sept.) ; Aftenposten Aften 1994 (25 May); 
Bergens Tidende 1993a (11 Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993d (30 Oct.); NTBtekst 1994b (19 Apr.); NTBtekst 1994c (19 May); 
VG 1993e (6 Sept) 
160 Aftenposten Morgen 1993f (11 Sept.) 
161 NTBtekst 1994b (19 Apr.) 
162 NTBtekst 1994c (19 May) 
163  Aftenposten Aften 1994 (25 May) 
164 Bergens Tidende 1993a (11 Sept.); see also Aftenposten Morgen 1993f (11 Sept.) In a similar vein, in an interview, Terje 
Rød Larsen states that the Norwegian approach is highly valued by European and American top diplomats. Bergens 
Tidende 1993d (30 Oct.) 
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Peres, and Jimmy Carter left Oslo on Thursday, they had all again placed small 
Norway on top of the list of nations fighting for peace on our planet.”165  
Supplementing the media‟s own evaluations of the Norwegian efforts, these references 
to international praise have the effect of corroborating and confirming the notion that 
Norway played an important role. By referring to external sources of authority and 
legitimacy, it confirms that the positive Norwegian evaluations are not subjective and 
self-centered.  
The above quotes illustrate the importance attached to Norway‟s contribution to peace 
in the Middle East. It is not surprising that Norwegian media focus on Norway‟s role 
and accomplishments in this case. What is interesting is that in doing so, the media 
constructs and reproduces an assessment of the Norwegian contribution as essential for 
the positive outcome of the process. Norway is thus invested with considerable 
agency, power, and ability when it comes to contributing to or creating peace, and 
discursive links between „Norway‟, „peace promotion‟ and „success‟ are established. 
4.1.2 Explaining the success of the Oslo Back Channel 
Apart from confirming that Norway‟s role was decisive, many of the newspaper 
articles in my material discuss what factors enabled Norway‟s contribution.166 These 
explanations seem to share a focus on the particularities of the Norwegian approach, 
implicitly arguing that its differences from other states‟ diplomatic approaches paved 
the way for its success.
167
 Certain concepts stand out:  
Secrecy, and the Norwegian officials‟ ability to keep the talks and negotiations 
between Israel and PLO out of public sight, is the most commonly articulated 
explanation for the success of the Oslo Back Channel.
168
 An article in  Bergens 
Tidende outlines the reasoning behind this assertion: “(…) the process illustrates that it 
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 Aftenposten Aften 1994 (25 May) 
166 A lot of the articles also mention what could be termed historical preconditions for the peace agreement. Here, I 
concentrate on the explanations given for Norway’s role and success as a third party. 
167 For an explicit articulation of the notion that Norway has particular qualifications in peace promotion, see Aftenposten 
Morgen 1993h (29 Sept.). The article quotes Jan Egeland. 
168 For a particularly clear articulation of this theme, see NTBtekst 1993e (10 Sept.). See also Aftenposten Morgen 1993h (29 
Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993b (11 Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993d (30 Oct.); Bergens Tidende 1993f (31 Dec.); NTBtekst 
1993g (14 Sept.); NTBtekst 1993i (29 Dec.); VG 1993f (10 Sept.) 
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may be easier to accomplish results when one can carry on with meticulous efforts 
outside the public‟s often merciless limelight, where one on an hourly basis are asked 
about whether things are moving in the right direction.”169 
Close personal contacts and resulting confidence from and access to the parties is also 
a common explanation. FAFO head Terje Rød-Larsen is repeatedly mentioned as the 
key person.
170
 In an early comment to Norway‟s role, VG says it this way: “To 
succeed in diplomacy, contacts on the personal level are required, and it is in this 
respect that FAFO head Terje Rød Larsen and the scholar Marianne Heiberg enter the 
picture.”171 The importance of close contacts is also underlined by Terje Rød Larsen 
himself
172
, and by Jan Egeland.
173
 In a similar vein, repeated references are made to 
the importance of confidence from and access to the parties.
174
 
The importance of contacts, confidence and access is also articulated with what may 
be termed a domestic party politics twist: The main Norwegian actors in the peace 
process were all Labor Party members (the government was a Labor party minority 
government), and some texts underlined that the Norwegian Labor movement‟s close 
contacts with both the parties enabled Norway to play an important role.
175
 However, 
the Oslo Back Channel was never described as a pure Labor Party undertaking, and it 
was by and large Norway‟s role that was underlined. As such, it appeared as a national 
project. 
Some articles also focus on the lack of Norwegian interests except in peace as a 
precondition for Norway‟s role.176 Jan Egeland articulates this particularly clearly: 
“We were, in contrast to the great powers, not seen as a state with other purposes than 
creating peace. Nobody attributed economic or strategic motives to us.”177 The 
rationale behind this argument seems to be that the lack of self interest in influencing 
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 Aftenposten Morgen 1993c (31 Aug.); Aftenposten Morgen 1993h (29 Sept.); Bergens Tidende 1993b (11 Sept.); Bergens 
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 VG 1993f (10 Sept) 
172 Bergens Tidende 1993d (30 Oct.) 
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175 NTBtekst 1993a (30 Aug.); NTBtekst 1993b (30 Aug.); VG 1993b (30 Aug.); VG 1993f (10 Sept.) 
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 Aftenposten Morgen 1993h (29 Sept.); NTBtekst 1992 (18 Aug.); NTBtekst 1993f (14 Sept.)  
177 Aftenposten Morgen 1993h (29 Sept.); for a similar articulation, see NTBtekst 1992 (18 Aug.) 
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the outcome of the negotiations in one way or the other made Norway an acceptable 
third party.  
4.1.3 The Norwegian diplomatic victory as good PR 
The last discursive construction I have identified in my material differs from the 
others. Drawing heavily on the notion that Norway gets international praise for its 
efforts, it concerns the positive effects for Norway of the success in the Middle East 
diplomacy. It may thus be seen as originating from an interest-based perspective.  
The link between Norway‟s efforts and positive effects in terms of self interests are 
articulated in two principal ways. The first focuses on Norway‟s success as a third 
party as a source of good PR or as „placing Norway on the world map‟.178 Already 
shortly after the revelation of the Back Channel, article headlines like „Holst gives us 
good PR‟179 and „Middle East peace gives good PR for Norway‟180 appeared. The 
latter article specifies the position: “Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen Holst 
and Fafo scholar Terje Rød Larsen have given Norway a kind of positive PR that we 
only could dream of.”181  
The second strand of articulations is more specific and focuses on the positive effect 
the success may have on the ongoing whaling negotiations. At the time of the 
revelation of the Oslo Back Channel, Norway was under heavy pressure 
internationally to stop whaling, and the US considered boycotting Norway. In this 
context, several newspaper articles articulated the position that Norway‟s recent 
diplomatic success may be an asset in the effort to prevent such a boycott.
182
 Headlines 
like „Does the Middle East peace stop boycott of Norway?‟183, and „Rides on a wave 
of sympathy in the finishing stages of the whaling case‟184 are illustrative. The 
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179 Aftenposten Aften 1993b (6 Sept.) 
180 NTBtekst 1993c (6 Sept.) 
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potential of using the peace effort for other ends is also explicitly mentioned: “There is 
no doubt that the peace effort has been duly noticed and may be utilized.”185  
The explicit linking of success in peace promotion and Norwegian self interests, and 
the notion that the resulting international sympathy may be utilized to Norway‟s 
advantage in international politics, are discursive innovations. In the material that 
predates the diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East peace process
186
, the 
beneficial consequences of peace promotion are related to global security, stability, 
and development, or „global common interests‟. The PR theme thus strengthens the 
self interest perspective; the lofty assumption that peace promotion in the last instance 
may contribute to Norway‟s security is supplemented by much more concrete 
assumptions about international political benefits, exemplified by the whaling case.  
4.1.4 Norway can play a role also in other peace negotiations 
So far, I have been concerned with the particularities of the discourse about the Middle 
East peace agreement. However, this discourse arguably has implications beyond this 
specific case. The discursive establishment of Norway‟s contribution as decisive for 
the positive outcome of the peace process, the investment in Norway of agency and 
influence, and the explanations of the contribution underlining the particularities and 
distinctness of the Norwegian approach, may be seen as paving the way for the 
establishment of a general peace engagement discourse. 
What was needed for such a general discourse to come into being was an explicit 
generalization of the discursive elements and concepts of the Middle East peace 
process discourse. And such a generalization of the hitherto particularistic discourse, 
making its concepts and discursive constructions relevant in other settings, was 
precisely what happened. From a discourse analytic perspective, it was a highly 
significant innovation.  
The assertion that Norway may play an important role in also in other peace processes 
originates with government officials, but it is articulated and reproduced in the public 
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 NTBtekst 1993g (14 Sept.) 
186 See the analysis of the foreign policy and development aid discourses in the pre 1993 chapter 
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realm of media coverage. A few weeks after the revelation of the Oslo Back Channel, 
an NTB article delivers the following statement: “Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan 
Jørgen Holst and his associates have underlined that small nations like Norway, having 
no great power interests, may play an important role also in other conflict areas.”187 
Referring to a lecture held by Jan Egeland on September 28
th
, three other articles 
articulate a similar position.
188
 The NTB article has the headline „Egeland about the 
Oslo process: We can do it again‟, which speaks for itself.189 The article in VG, with 
the headline „The world is waiting for Holst‟, focuses on international requests for 
Norwegian assistance: “From all over the world, requests for aid from the Norwegian 
peace team that secured the peace agreement between Israel and PLO are received.”190   
The media also reproduces the view that Norway may play a role in peace processes in 
general through newspaper articles speculating about new „Oslo Channels‟.191 In an 
article named „”Norwegian channel” for peace in Croatia‟, Bergens Tidende claims 
that a secret back channel for negotiations between the parties to the conflict in Croatia 
has been established.
192
 VG similarly states that Norwegian actors have “developed a 
kind of mini version of the success of the secret Middle East negotiations”.193 In the 
same vein, a comment on an academic seminar on Sudan is given the headline „No 
Oslo-peace for Sudan‟.194 Finally, VG states that “Norway has, in large parts of the 
world, become known as a kind of ”World‟s peace office”, a country trying to solve 
conflicts without one of the parties defeating the other militarily.”195 Norway is thus 
firmly established as a country capable of contributing to peace in various conflicts.  
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4.2 The Establishment of a Dominant Representation 
As we have just seen, the Norwegian media coverage of the Middle East peace process 
laid the basis for a distinct discourse centering on Norwegian peace engagement. It 
also provided discursive resources and paved the way for the emergence of a dominant 
representation within the discourse. In this section, I analyze this representation‟s 
establishment and reproduction in the official texts that comment on the peace 
engagement
196
, and outline the concepts and meanings it centers on. The clear and 
consistent discursive patterning of the texts, and their reproduction of notions and 
concepts, indicate that the discourse is stable and that a dominant representation has 
emerged.
197
 The underlying argument throughout is that the emerging representation‟s 
position of discursive dominance is secured precisely as a result of its reproduction in 
these authoritative texts.  
4.2.1 Norway has given important contributions to peace 
The construction of Norway‟s involvement as important for the success of peace 
processes, particularly in the Middle East, but also elsewhere, is articulated implicitly 
or explicitly in all the texts. In his 1993 Foreign Policy Address delivered shortly after 
the revelation of the Oslo Back Channel, Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jørgen 
Holst confirms that Norway had a central role in securing the breakthrough, thus 
giving legitimacy to the views expressed in the media.
198
 Holst goes on to state that the 
Norwegian engagement  shows that we may contribute constructively to peace and 
security: “Our efforts in the Middle East peace process are a contribution to creating 
peace in one of Europe‟s central neighboring areas. It shows that small countries may 
play a role.”199 It should also be noted that Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland 
delivers very similar statements in her 1994 New Year Address.
200
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 This includes newspaper articles emanating from the political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 1995 
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to the Storting.  
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Johan Jørgen Holst‟s successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bjørn Tore Godal, also 
repeatedly underlines the importance of Norway‟s peace efforts.201 His 1996 Foreign 
Policy Address establishes Norway as an efficient and sought-after contributor to 
peace, and states that the present engagement builds on strong traditions:  
Through our long-lasting and strong solidarity engagement for peace and democracy, 
Norway has built up confidence and credibility. Our participation is sought not only in 
peacekeeping operations, even though such operations still are of great importance. We 
often receive requests to take part in conflict solving and peace creating initiatives.
202
  
The Official Report similarly states that lately, “Norway has made itself conspicuous 
internationally as a mediator on the international scene.”203 And in the White paper, 
the Norwegian involvements in the Middle East, Guatemala, Sudan, Sri Lanka, former 
Yugoslavia, South Africa, Eritrea and Mozambique are all seen as contributing to 
peace.
204
 The clearest articulations of Norway‟s ability to promote peace are, however, 
delivered by State Secretary Jan Egeland. In a radio interview, he says it this way: 
The Oslo Agreement, the Guatemala Agreements, and our efforts in South Africa, our 
efforts on Balkan, shows that small Norway may play a role that the super powers cannot 
in a range of different situations, and we have played such a role the last four-five years, 
clearer than any other small nation, ever, I think, in world history.
 205
  
Taken together, these statements unequivocally establish Norway‟s peace engagement 
as capable of contributing substantially to peace processes in general. They thus 
confirm the media‟s view of Norwegian capabilities, inscribing Norway with 
considerable agency as a third party and perpetuating the link between „Norway‟ and 
„peace promotion‟.  
4.2.2 Peace promotion is an important part of Norway’s foreign policy 
In my material, this position is almost as pervasive as the construction of Norway as a 
contributor to peace. Johan Jørgen Holst articulates it very clearly already a few weeks 
after the signing of the Oslo Accords: “The continuation of the peace promotion in the 
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202 Godal, Bjørn Tore 1996 
203 Norwegian Official Report 1995, pp. 189f  
204 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995, p. 19; see also Norwegian Official Report 1995, pp. 189f 
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Also in other interviews, Egeland implicitly stated that Norway’s contributions to peace were substantial. See Aftenposten 
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Middle East will be the fourth main challenge [out of five challenges] in our foreign 
policy.”206 Bjørn Tore Godal follows suit in his first Foreign Policy Address207:  
The government has strongly emphasized conflict preventing operations as a central goal 
of our foreign policy(…) Norway has played an active role also in other regional 
conflicts, for example in Guatemala. The experience from the mediator role in the Middle 
East negotiations has taught us that this kind of work is very time consuming. The 
setbacks are numerous, and very few attempts succeed. The results may often seem far 
away, but when progress is made and peace may be the result, the effort has proved to be 
well worth it. The government aims at strengthening the effort for peace creating and 
conflict preventative measures (…)208 
This piece of text does several things: First, it establishes that Norway is active in 
peace promotion in several regional conflicts. Then it concludes that these efforts are 
worthwhile, even when we experience numerous setbacks. This implies that the peace 
engagement should not be stopped if positive results are not forthcoming; it is in other 
words a powerful defense of the engagement that makes it difficult to criticize.  In line 
with this reasoning, it is stated that peace promotion and conflict prevention will be 
strengthened. Similar articulations of the position that peace promotion is an important 
part of the foreign policy are also to be found in Godal‟s 1995, 1996, and 1997 Foreign 
Policy Addresses.
 209
 
Adding strength to the impression that peace engagement is considered important, the 
White Paper and the Official Report also pay substantial attention to issues of peace 
and conflict.
210
 In the White Paper, “peace, conflict resolution, and democracy 
promotion” is consistently treated as the first point on the agenda.211 It states that 
active participation in peace promotion is a major innovation in Norway‟s 
international engagement, and that such efforts will be highly prioritized where 
Norway may make a difference.
212
 The Report similarly underlines peace promotion as 
one of three main goals of Norwegian South policy, and state that Norway should be 
prepared to use more resources on peace and conflict resolution measures than 
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previously.
213
 These texts‟ focus on peace promotion is distinctly innovative when we 
compare them to previous White Papers.
 214
 
Through the authority of the Foreign Policy Addresses and the White Paper, peace 
promotion is, shortly after the initial success of the involvement in the Middle East 
peace process, elevated to the position of a primary foreign policy goal. Given the 
novelty of the practice of peace promotion, the swiftness with which this happened is 
remarkable. The establishment and dominance of the linking of Norway‟s contribution 
in the Middle East peace process on the one hand, and the successful outcome on the 
other, is very likely an important precondition for this to happen. Without the 
particular discursive construction of the event of the Oslo Agreement, it would be 
difficult to elevate peace promotion to such an important position.  
4.2.3 Norway’s distinctive approach to peace promotion 
A substantial part of the analyzed texts give partial explanations for Norway‟s success 
as a peace promoter. In doing so, they implicitly or explicitly invoke the notion that 
the Norwegian approach has certain distinguishing features. It should also be noted 
that they draw on and reproduce the media coverage‟s focus on close personal 
contacts, confidence from the parties, and lack of Norwegian interests except in peace. 
In his 1993 Foreign Policy Address, Johan Jørgen Holst underlines that Norway could 
play the third party role in the Middle East due to confidence from the parties, 
Norway‟s lack of interests in a specific outcome, and the facilitative approach that was 
adopted.
215
 Holst‟s successor, Bjørn Tore Godal, focuses on the government‟s 
cooperation with NGOs and academic institutions as an important feature of the 
Norwegian approach.
216
 Godal also states that this cooperation will be further 
developed as a means to strengthen Norway‟s peace promotion efforts.217 Previously, 
the importance of cooperation with non-state actors had only been hinted at through 
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references to FAFOs role Oslo Back Channel. Godal‟s focus on this is therefore a 
discursive innovation.  
The innovation is, moreover, taken up by other texts and thus soon becomes part of the 
dominant representation. State Secretary Jan Egeland articulates it clearly:  
In our total foreign policy, our small country must utilize all the available resources in a 
flexible way (…) This involves to further develop the Norwegian model where the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperates with a network of voluntary organizations and 
academic institutions, in UN circles termed “the Norwegian Model”.218  
The White Paper and the Official report eventually go one step further than the other 
texts, constituting Norway as having certain comparative advantages in peace 
promotion: “As a small country enjoying great international confidence, Norway may 
have a comparative advantage precisely in such settings. Our extensive emergency aid 
efforts create confidence and credibility(…)”219 The concept of comparative 
advantages, and the underlining of the importance of the state - NGO cooperation, may 
be seen as implicitly referring to Jan Egeland‟s book “Impotent Superpower – Potent 
Small State”, where it is stated that Norway has several potential advantages over the 
US in human rights promotion.
220
 Egeland‟s argument, although originally not 
concerning peace promotion, is imported and used in a peace promotion setting. 
Intertextual and interdiscursive links are thus established. 
4.2.4 Motivation for the engagement: “Self interest and altruism go hand in 
hand” 
The notion that self interest and altruism „go hand in hand‟ or „pull in the same 
direction‟ is borrowed from Liland & Kjerland, who quote the State Secretaries Helga 
Hernes and Asbjørn Mathisen as its source.
221
 It is illustrative of the official position 
on the motivation behind the peace engagement, as it appears in the analyzed texts. It 
is emphasized that the peace engagement is grounded on altruism, values, and 
idealism. However, it is at the same time beneficial in a self interest perspective. 
Altruism and self interests are in other words linked and seen as compatible. 
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This position is no novelty in Norwegian foreign policy discourse. Also prior to 1993, 
the White Papers had constructed global engagement of different strands as motivated 
by self interest, global common interests, and altruism.
222
 The security aspect was 
particularly emphasized; engagement to improve the conditions of the developing 
countries was seen as enhancing Norway‟s own security.223 
The dominant representation of the peace engagement draws on and reproduces this 
focus on security. In his 1993 Foreign Policy Address, Johan Jørgen Holst states that 
“(…) it is natural that we concentrate our efforts on the geographical areas where we 
have the most experience, and the ones that have the greatest influence on our own 
security.”224 Bjørn Tore Godal follows suit; in his 1995 and 1997 Foreign Policy 
Addresses, he underlines that Norway‟s global engagement strengthens our own 
security.
225
 The Official Report and the White Paper also emphasize global common 
interests, including security and stability, as important motivations for engagement.
226
  
Several texts also explicitly state that the peace engagement is grounded on altruism.
227
 
In 1995, Bjørn Tore Godal emphasizes that solidarity is the basis for the peace 
engagement
228
, and in 1997, he states that the efforts are motivated by an ethical 
responsibility.
229
 The Official Report discusses the issue quite extensively and 
concludes that the peace engagement may be considered ethically and morally based 
action.
230
 In the White Paper, solidarity and humanitarian values are mentioned as 
motivation.
231
 
Despite these continuities with previous discourse, innovations also appear. The 
authoritative sanctioning of the construction of the peace engagement as able to 
strengthen Norway‟s international standing and ability to promote its narrow self 
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interests is notable in this respect. State Secretary Jan Egeland stands behind the 
perhaps clearest articulations of the self interest perspective during this period. In a 
VG article named „Peace success as exchange asset‟232, he focuses on how Norway‟s 
success in peace promotion may enable it to be heard internationally:  
A trump card is Norway‟s success as peace mediator in several international conflicts. 
We can exchange information on the international market if we are perceived as 
interesting. Our status in for example the Middle East enables us, in other settings, to 
meet on a higher level and in more comprehensive talks. They are interested in our 
assessments. This way, we may get information back that is important to Norway.
233
 
In another article, Egeland is quoted saying that “Norwegian foreign policy has 
become one of our best export products” and that it gives Norway “unique PR.”234  
Through these articulations, the self interest perspective articulated in the media 
coverage
235
 is strengthened and invested with legitimacy.  
However, the self interest focus was not entirely uncontroversial. When the 1995 
White Paper followed Egeland‟s lead, emphasizing self interest as motivation236, it was 
met with strong criticism. A quite heated parliamentary debate ensued; several of the 
speakers underline solidarity and altruistic values, and explicitly attack the 
Government‟s underlining of self interests.237 This criticism indicates a discursive 
struggle over the very meaning of the Norwegian engagement for the South. The 
established and (at least up to this point) hegemonic representation within the 
development aid discourse, which underlines will to do good and ethical and moral 
principles embedded in the Norwegian people, is mobilized and defended.
238
 However, 
this representation is no longer dominant; the White Paper‟s articulation of self 
interests as an important additional motivation shows that the discourse is open on this 
point and that different positions may coexist.  
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4.2.5 The relationship between development assistance and peace promotion 
The analysis of the pre 1993 White Papers showed that „peace‟ was a subordinate 
category, treated either as a beneficial consequence of development or as a 
precondition for development to take place. Similarly, peace promotion was seen as a 
development aid tool. „Development‟ was the main nodal point of the discourse.239  
The 1995 Report and White Paper articulate a different relationship in this respect. In 
line with previous texts, they construct a causal relationship of mutual dependence 
between peace and development.
240
 The innovation lies in the treatment of 
development aid as a potentially important tool in concrete efforts that have peace 
promotion as their main goal.
241
 Similarly, peace promotion is treated as an important 
part of Norway‟s overall foreign policy, and not only as a tool in the development 
policy.
242
 The importance attached to coordination and integration of development aid, 
humanitarian assistance, and peace promotion efforts
243
 also suggests that these are 
seen as categories on an equal footing, and that „development‟ no longer is privileged. 
In other words, „peace‟ emerges as a primary goal, alongside „development‟, of the 
government‟s South-policy.  
Corroborating these findings, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal, in his 
1995 Foreign Policy Address, states that “Norway will still be active in conflict 
resolution, prevention of new conflicts, and furthering of democracy and 
development.”244 „Conflict resolution‟ and „prevention of new conflicts‟ are here 
categories on an equal footing with „furthering of democracy and development‟, and 
the fact that they are mentioned first suggests that they are regarded as important. In 
discourse analytic terminology, peace is juxtaposed to development as a nodal point 
and an organizing concept of the discourse. This adds further legitimacy to the claim 
that a distinct peace engagement discourse now had emerged also in official, 
authoritative texts.  
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4.3 Criticism of the Peace Engagement: an Emerging Alternative 
Representation 
Despite the overwhelming discursive dominance of the representation presented 
above, texts that do not draw on this representation and that articulate criticism of the 
peace engagement also exist. In this period, the criticism is principally articulated by 
two actors; MPs from the Conservative Party and Nils Morten Udgaard, Aftenposten‟s 
foreign policy editor. 
In the parliamentary debate over the 1995 Foreign Policy Address, the Conservative 
Party MP Kaci Kullmann Five delivers the following statement: 
I also ask for a signal from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of greater concentration in 
Norwegian foreign policy. (…) In the area of peace mediation I have urged a measure of 
prudence in the future. I have not said that Norway now should withdraw from the peace 
process in Guatemala. But I have warned against further diffusion. Not because the 
mediation process in itself necessarily will be a burden, but because the Government 
always comes back to the Storting with proposals to spend relatively large sums on 
various efforts in these countries.
245
  
Kullmann Five and the other Conservative Party MPs go on to underline the 
importance of Norway‟s neighboring areas and suggest that the peace engagement 
may take attention away from them.
246
 Jan Petersen says it this way:  
It seems like the Norwegian role in Guatemala is given as much or more attention than 
our policy towards the Baltic. The result is a lack of focus on what is most important for 
the nation: What directly concerns Norway (…)247  
These arguments are repeated in the 1996 and 1997 Parliamentary Debates over 
Norway‟s foreign policy.248  
The Conservative Party‟s criticism was followed up by Nils Morten Udgaard. He 
wrote several articles where he criticized the current foreign policy for lack of 
priorities and for not looking after Norway‟s real interests. In the first of the articles, 
he states that there are clear isolationist tendencies in the current foreign policy: 
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Now, it [Norwegian isolationism] presents itself again, disguised as a global and 
unlimited Norwegian engagement for emergency aid and peace promotion – without 
priorities and real binding obligations for the generous Norway.
249
  
Udgaard attributes these tendencies to “vagueness at the level of ideas concerning the 
question of what foreign policy really is” and state that the result is that “Norwegian 
interests wind up in the background”. 250 Udgaard later repeated this criticism in an 
article about Norway‟s foreign policy standing: “The real prioritization of Norwegian 
interests is increasingly difficult to see.”251  
Although rather marginal, the Conservative Party MPs‟ and Nils Morten Udgaard‟s 
criticism of the lack of concentration, priorities and attention to real Norwegian 
interests in Norwegian foreign policy add up to an alternative representation of the 
peace engagement. This representation draws heavily on what may be termed „realist‟ 
notions of national interests
252
, and may thus be termed a „realist representation‟. 
„Norway‟s real interests‟, „neighboring areas‟, and „concentration‟/ „prioritization‟ are 
its key terms or nodal points. On the basis of these concepts, it explicitly challenges 
the dominant representation‟s underlining of the importance of the peace engagement 
in Norway‟s foreign policy. It is also implicitly critical towards the notion that the 
peace engagement improves Norway‟s security and international standing. While not 
rejecting the peace engagement outright
253
, the representation suggests that Norway 
should not make peace promotion a crucial part of the foreign policy.  
The emergence of this realist representation implies that within the peace engagement 
discourse, the concepts of „peace engagement‟, „foreign policy‟, and „Norwegian 
interests‟ become contested. The two representations fill them with radically different 
meanings, and they thus assume the quality of floating signifiers. The dominant 
representation  links all the concepts together and inscribes them with meaning 
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through linking them to „altruism‟, „duty‟, „solidarity‟, and „will to do good‟ on the 
one hand, and „self interest‟, „security‟, and „international standing‟ on the other. The 
realist representation links „peace engagement‟ primarily to „altruism‟; and „foreign 
policy‟ and „Norwegian interest‟ to „self interests‟ and „neighboring areas‟. In other 
words, it constructs no links between „peace engagement‟ and the other concepts. 
Rather, peace engagement is constructed as incompatible with foreign policy, which 
should primarily focus on securing Norway‟s (narrow) self interests.  
Just as we would expect from a discourse analytic perspective, the criticism of the 
peace engagement and articulation of the „realist representation‟ did not go unnoticed. 
A substantial number of MPs from the Socialist Left Party, the Labor Party and the 
Christian Democratic Party criticized the Conservative Party and defended the peace 
engagement.
254
 Similarly, Udgaard‟s claims were met with heavy counter criticism in 
the form of newspaper articles written by State Secretary Jan Egeland255 and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal.  Godal‟s main argument centers on security and 
interdependence: by contributing to safeguarding peoples‟ security in other countries, 
we ultimately improve our own security. He also underlines that the peace engagement 
has led to “positive international attention”, and then warns against “constructing an 
artificial incompatibility between Norwegian national interests in our neighboring 
areas and our emergency efforts for vulnerable people in countries ridden by war or 
conflict.”256 By explicitly invoking the same self interest perspective that the peace 
promotion criticism takes as its starting point, Godal mounts a powerful discursive 
defense of the Norwegian engagement. 
4.4 Summary 
After the revelation of Norway‟s role in the Middle East peace process, a distinct 
peace engagement discourse emerges. The media coverage of the peace process lays 
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the basis for the discourse. Discursive structures are established, and above all, it is 
asserted that Norway can play a role in peace processes generally. The subsequent 
treatment of the peace engagement in official texts reproduces the media coverage‟s 
concepts and constructions, and the resulting discourse is structured and stable. This 
indicates that a dominant representation of the peace engagement has been established; 
a representation constructing the engagement as very important. In this respect, it 
should also be noted that „peace‟, which previously had been a subordinate category, 
was discursively juxtaposed to „development‟ as a goal of the Norwegian South 
policy. 
The dominant representation does several things. First, it firmly establishes the view 
that the policy of peace promotion has yielded positive results and that it therefore is 
worthwhile. Second, and related, it invests Norway with considerable agency and 
ability to contribute to peace, and constructs the Norwegian approach as distinct.  
Third, it establishes that the peace engagement not only enables Norway to make the 
world better, it also is beneficial in a self interest perspective. In doing so, it 
naturalizes the extensive peace promotion efforts, through which Norway became 
involved in a number of conflicts literally all over the world, and legitimizes the 
importance that is accorded to them.  
However, and despite this representation‟s dominance and powerful effects, dissent 
and criticism of the peace engagement do exist. The „realist representation‟ offers a 
different perspective on the peace engagement, centering on „realist‟ concepts of „real 
interests‟ and „concentration‟/„prioritization‟. The very existence of an alternative 
representation also shows that the dominant representation is not hegemonic: the 
meaning of the discourse‟s central organizing concepts of „peace engagement‟, 
„foreign policy‟, and „Norwegian interests‟ are contested, and the concepts may thus 
be seen as floating signifiers. The extensive peace engagement is, in other words, still 
not taken for granted or necessary, and it is open to debate. 
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5 Consolidation of Peace Engagement and Discourse: 
1997-2003 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the consolidation of the Norwegian peace 
engagement, in terms of both discourse and practice. At the level of practice, the 
period saw a consolidation, expansion, and institutionalization of the peace 
engagement under three different governments.
257
 Norway continued its engagement 
in the Middle East and Guatemala; became involved in peace processes in Cyprus, 
Haiti, Mali, Sudan, Sri Lanka (more heavily than previously), and Colombia; and 
involved itself strongly in peace promoting work in Europe and Eurasia within the 
OSCE.
258
 In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a new section termed „section for peace 
and reconciliation‟ was established in 2002.259  
The discourse was also consolidated. The dominant and official representation of the 
Norwegian peace engagement identified in the previous section was continuously 
rearticulated and thus reproduced and strengthened. I here focus on the innovations: 
increasing emphasis on the self interest perspective, the discursive establishment of 
„the Norwegian Model‟, and the assertion that „Norway is a peace nation‟.  
Despite the continuing preponderance of the dominant representation, two alternative 
representations of the peace engagement also exist; the realist and idealist 
representations.  I present and analyze them towards the end of the chapter.  
The end of the period, inaugurated by stronger criticism, clearer articulation of the 
alternative representations, and a reflexive discursive turn where „Norway as a peace 
nation‟ or „humanitarian great power‟ is viewed as a self image, is rather open ended. 
Some of these tendencies emerge before 2003, but I have chosen to treat them in the 
next chapter. 
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5.1 The Dominant Representation: Reproduction and Innovation  
The most notable feature of the peace engagement discourse from 1997 to 2003 is the 
reproduction of the dominant representation as identified in the previous chapter. Due 
to the limited scope of the thesis, there is no space for analyzing this reproduction in 
detail. Here, I briefly present the most salient concepts and constructions before 
turning to the discursive innovations. 
5.1.1 Norway plays an important role in numerous peace processes 
The discursive construction of Norway as playing an important peace promoting role 
in a lot of conflict areas is continuously rearticulated and reproduced in official texts
260
 
as well as texts appearing in the news media.
261
 The clearest „official‟ articulation of 
this construction is to be found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs‟ report on Norway‟s 
general peace engagement.
262
 It is named „Norway in the service of peace. Norwegian 
contributions to peace and reconciliation‟, which speaks for itself.263 
It is also notable that Norway‟s important role and ability to contribute were heavily 
underlined in media reports on diplomatic efforts.
264
 Headlines like „The parties in the 
Middle East quarrel, the US and Norway will make peace‟265 and „Norway in new key 
role in the Middle East‟266 are telling in this respect. Although I have identified three 
newspaper articles that challenge the discursive construction of Norway‟s role as 
decisive
267
, the construction nevertheless maintains a very strong position. It inscribes 
Norway with considerable agency and ability to create a peaceful solution, and it 
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establishes beyond doubt that the efforts are worthwhile. The result is that Norway‟s 
engagement is naturalized.  
5.1.2 Norway gets international acclaim for its peace promotion 
This discursive element is closely related to the one presented above, and it 
corroborates it by lending it legitimacy from external sources of authority. The 
international acclaim Norway receives is underlined in some official texts
268
, but it is 
more common in newspaper articles. In an interview, former State Secretary Jan 
Egeland articulates it this way: 
In this period, independent Norwegian initiatives in conflict areas were valued and 
encouraged by the UN, from human rights groups, and even from the great powers. In 
Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and New York, more “Oslo diplomacy” was requested as 
the peace agreements emerged in Central America, Mali, Israel and PLO; and for 
cooperation over the water resources in the Middle East.
269
 
The Norwegian media also duly notes Time Magazine‟s praise of Norway‟s efforts: 
“A mighty trumpet for peace. A master in the art of diplomacy. This is the way 
Norway is portrayed in the last number of Time Magazine”, writes Aftenposten, and 
goes on to state that Norway is praised as a “great power in peace and aid”.270 
Similarly, it is repeatedly suggested that Norway is a sought-after peace promoter.
271
 
5.1.3 Peace engagement is an important part of Norway’s foreign policy 
Between 1993 and 1997, peace engagement was constructed as an important part of 
Norway‟s foreign policy. Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik actualized this 
position through the following statement: “The Government will continue an active 
Norwegian international engagement in 2000. (…) the work for peace and conflict 
resolution is central in Norwegian foreign policy.”272 Shortly after assuming office in 
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2000, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorbjørn Jagland similarly stated that 
“besides the Europe policy and the Northern areas, an active peace promotion policy 
will be a prioritized task for the government.”273 It should also be noted that several 
official texts express a wish to continue and expand the peace promotion efforts, and 
as such, they may be seen as supporting the position.
274
 The few explicit articulations 
may indeed be seen as suggesting that the importance accorded to peace promotion in 
the foreign policy seemed self evident or „natural‟, and that it was therefore not 
necessary to confirm it discursively.
275
 The fact that the peace engagement was 
widened and strengthened supports this interpretation. 
5.1.4 Motivation: “Idealism and self interest go hand in hand” 
Like in the 1993-1997 period, the motivation behind the Norwegian peace engagement 
is a major discursive theme. There are clear discursive continuities here; the 
construction of the peace engagement as motivated both by idealism and self interest, 
and of the two motivations as compatible, is continuously reproduced in texts 
emanating from the Government, the Parliament, and the wider media scene.
276
 
The self-interest dimension in the discourse may be broken down into two principal 
parts. First is the notion that the peace engagement contributes to Norway‟s security in 
a long-term perspective. We therefore have an interest in promoting peace, stability, 
and international order. This perspective was common in the 1993 to 1997 period, and 
it continues to be so now, particularly in official discourse.
277
 Second is the notion that 
activist peace promotion improves Norway‟s international standing and prestige, thus 
making Norway interesting and giving access to important forums and decision 
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makers. It may be termed an instrumentalist perspective, underlining the peace 
engagement‟s ability to further general Norwegian self interests. What is new is that 
this perspective comes much more strongly to the fore during this period. 
Authoritative official texts
278
, other texts emanating from the Government and the 
Parliament
279
, newspaper articles
280
, and feature articles written by scholars
281
 all 
articulate it explicitly. In an interview, Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebæk 
delivers a particularly clear articulation: 
 (…)Vollebæk underlines that precisely the fact that we have become actors, makes us 
more interesting for the others. - Our Middle East engagement has made us interesting. 
When I talk with Kinkel, with van den Broek and Axworthy and Talbott [European 
leaders], they are very interested in what happened in the Middle East. What did I make 
out of my visit there? What is my view on that? And then I can slip in some words about 
salmon and the gas market directive and such things, because I have already given them 
something.
282
 
On a more conceptual level, State Secretary Janne Haaland Matlary‟s treatment of 
what she calls „value based‟ foreign policy is notable. Matlary states that this kind of 
policy, focusing on peace promotion, democracy building, development aid, and 
human rights dialogues, gives Norway a “strong international status” and gives the 
country “considerable political capital”.283 In a similar vein, Torgeir Larsen state that 
the peace engagement is “Norway‟s best foreign policy niche product” and “the 
Atlantist Jan Petersen‟s best card as a Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs”.284   
The prominence of the instrumentalist perspective implies that the very focus of the 
discourse is changing. The meaning of the peace engagement is increasingly tied to 
furthering of Norwegian interests unrelated to peace. However, there is a tension in the 
instrumentalist perspective: it is repeatedly suggested that the peace engagement gives 
us political capital and influence because and only insofar as it is based on idealism or 
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values.
285
 The peculiar blend of idealism and self interest in the dominant 
representation of the peace engagement is therefore reproduced.  
5.1.5 A distinct and successful Norwegian approach - the Norwegian Model286 
This discursive element draws on the constructions of Norway as having particular 
qualifications in peace promotion, and of the Norwegian approach as distinct. It is thus 
a composite category, consisting of at least four distinct elements.
287
 What is new is 
that some texts explicitly treat them as part of a systematic and integrated approach to 
peace promotion, „the Norwegian Model‟.288 This has the effect of cementing the 
approach, and of strengthening the discursive construction of Norway as able to 
contribute in a unique manner. 
The first element in „the Norwegian Model‟ is the notion that Norway has certain 
small state advantages
289
 in peace promotion. Norway has no colonial past
290
, no great 
power interests
291
, no historical or vested interests
292
, and no muscle to pressure the 
parties to enter an agreement
293
. These characteristics are in some texts seen as 
ensuring Norwegian impartiality and neutrality, and thus increasing the parties‟ 
confidence in Norway.
294
 
Second, the close cooperation between Norwegian authorities, NGOs, and academic 
institutions, allowing the authorities to draw on the NGOs‟ and academic institutions‟ 
flexibility, experience, and contacts in conflict areas when engaging in peace 
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promotion, is underlined.
295
 This cooperation is often regarded as the lynchpin of the 
Norwegian approach; the very concept of „the Norwegian Model‟ is often equated with 
this cooperation.
296
  
Third, the Norwegian approach is seen as emphasizing and drawing on close contact 
with and confidence from the parties. This position is articulated in a large number of 
texts when explaining apparent Norwegian successes.
297
 Close contacts enable Norway 
to play a facilitative role, passing on information, arranging meetings, and promoting 
understanding between the parties, rather than mediating.
298
 It should also be noted 
that close contact and confidence is often discursively linked to and seen as relying on 
the NGOs‟ and academic institutions‟ network of contacts.299  
Fourth, a long-term perspective on peace building, including aid and economic 
support for reconstruction after peace agreements have been secured, is also often seen 
as part of the Norwegian approach.
300 Norway‟s ability and willingness to support and 
bolster peace processes by giving substantial economic aid is in several texts 
constructed as both a reason for Norway‟s popularity as a peace promoter, and for its 
success.
301
 Moreover, the long-term perspective is in some texts explained with 
reference to the stability and consensus that characterize Norwegian foreign policy.
302
  
The „Norwegian Model‟ that is now discursively established, seems to be heavily 
inspired by Jan Egeland‟s “Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State”. The four 
preconditions for efficient human rights promotion he presents there
303
 is very similar 
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to the elements constituting „the Norwegian Model‟ in peace promotion. This indicates 
strong intertextual and interdiscursive links.
304
  
5.1.6 Norway is a peace nation: a new discursive element 
The most notable discursive development within the dominant representation in this 
period is the establishment of the notion that „Norway is a peace nation‟. Prime 
Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik introduced it, and he remained its primary carrier. 
Bondevik articulated the notion already at a party conference in April 1999.305 This 
was, however, merely a prelude to a much more prominent articulation. In this New 
Year Address 1 January 2000, when outlining his visions for Norway‟s role in the new 
millennium, the Prime Minister delivered the following statement:    
Norway must be a peace nation– an actor for conflict resolution and peace creating 
efforts. A nation following the strategy of Nordahl Grieg: “If you create human dignity, 
you create peace.” (…) I wish that our capital will appear as an international peace city. If 
we are remembered as a peace nation, Norwegians have reason to be proud.
306
 
Bondevik also underlined that Norway “must be a nation of charity and solidarity”, 
and that we should “follow in the footsteps of Fridtjof Nansen through devout efforts 
for fugitives and suffering people”.307 Bondevik followed this up this in his 2003 New 
Year Address, making peace one of the main themes of this speech:  
As a Christian culture nation, the work for peace has been one of the bases that Norway 
has built on for centuries. That is perhaps our most well-known hallmark internationally. 
This work will continue. (…)Norway shall be a peace nation.308   
The New Year Addresses by the Prime Minister have a very broad reception in the 
Norwegian public, and from the perspective of this thesis, the sustained focus on the 
peace engagement is notable. Bondevik here establishes the peace engagement as one 
of the most important distinguishing characteristics of Norway, and as a significant 
foreign policy practice. The references to Norway‟s Christian culture, Fridtjof Nansen, 
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and the historic legacies of humanitarianism and peace activism
309
; and the linking of 
these traditions to the current peace engagement; add to its legitimacy by suggesting 
that it is not merely a new foreign policy practice. It has to do with the very nature of 
the Norwegian nation. Peace is thus essentialized as part of Norway‟s core identity and 
self image, and tradition and continuity is discursively constructed. The historical 
references and the construction of continuity may, with references to genealogical 
theory, be seen as a discursive move working to legitimize the dominant representation 
and its related practices.
310
 If we follow Bondevik‟s line of reasoning, peace promotion 
indeed appears as a necessary practice for the reproduction of Norwegian identity.
311
  
5.2 ‘Realist’ Criticism: Reproduction of an Alternative Representation  
In the previous chapter, we saw that an alternative realist representation of the peace 
engagement emerged. This representation is still present in the 1997 – 2003 period, 
and its position remains marginal. Its primary carriers are still MPs from the 
Conservative Party and Nils Morten Udgaard. Towards the end of the period, Progress 
Party MPs also join in.  
The representation remains virtually unchanged; it is still organized around the 
concepts of „Norway‟s real interests‟, „neighboring areas‟, and „concentration‟/ 
„prioritization‟. Udgaard upholds his claim that humanitarian efforts is the core of the 
Government‟s foreign policy, that the Government lacks a proper foreign policy 
strategy, and that Norway‟s interests therefore are disregarded.312 The Conservative 
Party MPs for their part reproduce the criticism of lack of priorities in Norwegian 
foreign policy and uphold their demand for increasing attention to the neighboring 
areas.
313
 However, the criticism appears as more muted and indirect than earlier; no 
mention is made of the peace engagement in direct relation to neither Udgaard‟s nor 
the Conservative Party‟s criticism. This may be taken to indicate that the discursive 
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constructions of Norway as a successful peace promoter, and of the engagement as 
beneficial also in a self interest perspective, at this time had become so firmly 
established that they appeared as natural and thus difficult to challenge.  
During the period, the Progress Party MPs also entered the scene as carriers of the 
realist representation.
314
 Nevertheless, the representation lost ground towards the end 
of the period. After becoming part of a coalition government in 2001, the Conservative 
Party changed its views on the peace promotion profoundly. Jan Petersen, who had 
been a prominent carrier of the realist representation, started articulating the dominant 
representation after he had assumed office as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
315
 Other 
MPs followed suit; they now underlined the Norwegian competence in peace 
promotion, and the positive consequences of the engagement in terms of influence and 
promotion of Norway‟s interests.316 At the end of the period, the realist representation 
therefore appears more marginal than ever.  
5.3 ‘Idealist’ Criticism: The Emergence of a Second Alternative 
Representation 
In the course of the period, texts that fit into neither of the two existing representations 
began to appear. These texts are not critical to the peace engagement per se; they are 
concerned with lack of idealism. As such, they add up to an emerging alternative 
representation of the peace engagement. This representation has two principal strands: 
the first attacks the dominant representation for underlining self interests and for not 
being idealistic enough; the other constructs Norwegian foreign policy practice as 
incompatible with the peace nation image. 
The first strand is primarily articulated by the scholar Henrik Thune. In a feature 
article, he discusses the rationale behind and grounds given for the peace engagement. 
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Thune finds that former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal and former 
State Secretary Jan Egeland “did not, to a sufficient extent, give moral actions or 
humanitarian efforts an independent status.”317 They rather focused on “national 
interests” and the peace engagement‟s beneficial consequences for Norway in terms of 
security. The result is that Norwegian interests determine where, why, and how 
Norway engages; and that humanitarian efforts are reduced to a tool in Norway‟s 
interest maximizing policy.
318
 Thune thus challenges the dominant representation‟s 
construction of self interests and idealism as compatible, and underlines that the 
engagement policy should be built on idealism.
319
  
The second strand of criticism is more common. Most of its articulations appear 
towards the end of the period. Focusing on the level of foreign policy practice, they 
further the view that we may only rightfully use the terms „peace nation‟ and 
„humanitarian great power‟ to characterize ourselves if our foreign policy lives up to 
the ideals implicit in them. In my material, this kind of foreign policy practice 
criticism first appears in a commentary article in 1999. The article criticizes the lack of 
Norwegian humanitarian involvement in Ethiopia and Eritrea, stating that the Prime 
Minister‟s assertion that „Norway is a peace nation‟ must lead to concrete action.320 A 
similar argument is set forth by Sturla J. Stålsett in 2002:  
The Bush administration‟s increasingly arrogant unilateralism, military rearmament and 
direct subversion of international law forces Norway to make a choice: Can we still be the 
US‟ best friend and [at the same time] profile ourselves as a frontrunner in human rights 
issues, a bridge builder for peace and reconciliation, and a “humanitarian great power”?321 
Stålsett here establishes a negative link between Norway‟s image as a frontrunner in 
human rights issues and bridge builder for peace and reconciliation on the one hand, 
and support for the American foreign policy on the other. 
The idealist criticism of Norwegian foreign policy practice really picks up in relation 
to the Iraq war. Early in 2003, an American-led invasion seemed imminent, and 
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Norwegian authorities were criticized for not adopting a clear anti-war stance. 
Articulations of this view often refer to the Prime Minister‟s assertion that „Norway is 
a peace nation‟ and state that if this is to be more than empty rhetoric, Norway must 
reject all actions towards Iraq performed without UN mandate.
322
 When Norway later 
contributed with military personnel to the US-led „reconstruction‟ of Iraq after the war, 
the peace nation image was mobilized in a similar fashion: 
We have a self image as a peaceful nation. (…) The government‟s eagerness to 
participate militarily in international conflicts stands in contrast to the building up of 
peace as a Norwegian brand.
323
 
In line with this, it is suggested that we (Norway) withdraw from the “US‟ military 
operations” and instead “cultivate our image as a peace nation.”324 
Although the „idealist representation‟ is a diverse category, we may identify some 
discursive constructions that set it apart. It is useful to distinguish between ideational 
constructions (how things should be) and constructions describing the current state of 
affairs (how things should not be) here. In the first category, we find a positive linkage 
of „Norway‟ and „foreign policy‟ to „peace engagement‟ and „humanitarian efforts‟. 
Moreover, the latter two, which are floating signifiers in the peace engagement 
discourse, are linked to  „altruism‟, „values‟, „duty‟ etc. „Peace engagement‟ is not 
linked to „Norway‟s interests‟ at all. The floating signifiers are thus inscribed with a 
different meaning than in the two other representations. 
In the second category (the current state of affairs), „foreign policy‟ is linked to 
„support for the US‟ and „participation in military operations‟. A link between „peace 
engagement‟ and „Norway‟s interests‟ is also constructed,  and „Norway‟s interests‟ 
are constructed as partly incompatible with „altruism‟, „values‟ etc. The statement that 
„Norway is a peace nation‟ is constructed as true only insofar as Norway‟s primary 
motivation is altruistic, and as a description of the current state of affairs, it is rejected 
or regarded with skepticism.  
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5.4 Summary 
Viewed in its totality, the peace engagement discourse in the period from 1997 to 2003 
is remarkably stable. The dominant representation by and large structures the texts, 
and its discursive elements and constructions are continuously reproduced. The 
emphasis on the distinctness of „the Norwegian Model‟, and the newly introduced 
notion that „Norway is a peace nation‟, serve to strengthen the dominant 
representation. The latter notion also has some distinct effects: it essentializes peace as 
a pivotal part of Norwegian identity and makes peace promotion a necessary and 
identity-bearing practice. Together with the other discursive constructions making up 
the dominant representation, it contributes towards naturalizing the substantial peace 
engagement, and to inscribe Norway with considerable agency as a peace promoter. 
Two alternative representations are also present in the discourse. The realist and 
idealist representations criticize the dominant representation and the Norwegian 
foreign policy from radically different perspectives; the former takes the lack of 
priorities and attention to „real‟ Norwegian interests as its starting point, the latter do 
exactly the opposite when claiming that self interest guides the policy, that morale and 
idealism should be higher on the agenda, and that Norway‟s foreign policy practice is 
not in line with the peace nation image.  
The realist representation is reproduced and remains largely unchanged, but when the 
Conservative Party embraces the dominant representation in 2001, it appears as more 
marginalized than ever. The new idealist representation emerges during the period, and 
in contrast to the realist representation, it gradually gains in strength. Nevertheless, the 
alternative representations do not threaten the position of the dominant representation, 
which remains largely intact in face of the criticism. In this respect, it should be noted 
that two of the dominant representation‟s key elements, the discursive construction of 
„the Norwegian Model‟ as giving Norway distinct advantages in peace promotion, and  
of Norway as playing an important role in several peace processes, are not challenged 
at all.   
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6 The Discourse is Opened, Discursive Struggle Ensues: 
2003-2008 
After a long period of discursive stability, where the dominant representation of the 
peace engagement maintained a strong position, the discourse shows signs of change 
in 2002 and 2003. The notion that „Norway is a peace nation‟ starts attracting 
academic attention, and „peace nation‟ is increasingly seen as denoting a prominent 
Norwegian self image. The resulting reflexive discursive turn has the effect of 
heightening the attention to the peace efforts; the number of texts concerned with it 
rockets. From 2003 and onwards, the dominant representation‟s meanings and 
discursive constructions are also more fiercely and directly challenged than previously, 
and particularly the realist representation gains in strength.  
The result of these developments is discursive struggle. The criticism is countered, and 
the dominant representation is articulated more clearly and strongly than ever before. 
The direction of the practical policy is not changed; the peace efforts are in fact 
strengthened, and more resources are spent.
325
 Moreover, the dominant representation 
linking „Norway‟ to „peace‟ is further institutionalized. In 2006, the Oslo Center for 
Peace and Human Rights is established,
326
 and the government funding for peace 
research also increases steadily.
327
 
In this chapter, I start with tracing the reflexive turn. Thereafter, I turn to the realist 
and idealist alternative representations, focusing particularly on how the realist 
representation is strengthened and widened to include new discursive constructions. 
Finally, I give an overview of the reproduction of the dominant representation and 
discuss the discursive struggle that marks the period. One caveat needs to be 
introduced: the scope of the thesis prevents me from including all relevant texts and 
covering and analyzing all the interesting discursive developments. This chapter thus 
presents and discusses what I consider to be the most salient discursive phenomena. 
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6.1 The Reflexive Turn: “Norway is a Peace Nation” as Self Image 
During the period 2003-2008, the attention to and scholarly interest in Norway‟s peace 
engagement and peace tradition rose markedly.
328
 Scholars traced the historical roots 
of the peace tradition and studied the contemporary peace engagement, and to an 
increasing extent, the notion that „Norway is a peace nation‟ was regarded as denoting 
a self image. The resulting reflexivity became part of the general peace engagement 
discourse through the attention the scholarly works received from the public, 
particularly through newspaper articles and active participation in the public debate by 
the scholars themselves.
329
 The reflexive discursive turn and establishment of the self 
image notion in the peace engagement discourse are, in other words, to a large extent 
driven by scholars and academics. The main focus of this section is thus on their 
contributions.  
While the scope of this study prevents me from studying the moving forces behind the 
increasing attention to the peace engagement and the resulting reflexivity, some 
explanations may be suggested. First, and most obvious, the peace engagement was 
now extensive, and it was regarded as an important part of Norway‟s foreign policy. 
Second, Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik repeatedly asserted that „Norway is a 
peace nation‟.330 Such explicit ontological statements may be seen as inviting criticism 
and a reflexive approach focusing on self images. Third, Norway‟s official centennial 
anniversary program abroad chose „Norway as a partner in peace and development‟ as 
one of three main themes.
331
 Moreover, it was suggested by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that the concepts of „peace nation‟ and „humanitarian great power‟ may be 
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Helge 2005, p. 239f 
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used in the international promotion and branding of Norway.
332
 Norway‟s peace 
engagement was in other words firmly placed in the limelight by the Government, and 
this may have contributed to the reflexive turn.
 333
 
According to my research, the first hints of reflexivity appeared in 2002; with Nina 
Witoszek‟s article „If peace is the problem, is Norway the solution?‟334 Witoszek 
suggests that the emphasis on peace promotion has heavily influenced Norwegians‟ 
identity and self image:  
In short, Norwegians have advanced from being a nature tribe to becoming a peace tribe, 
which makes them morally superior to the rest of the world. This is a tasty, if dangerous, 
fruit to eat [self image to indulge in]. But this is the way the world sees Norway, and it is 
the way Norwegians – this is my assertion – will look upon themselves in the near 
future.
335
 
She goes on to treat the peace nation image as a mythology with basis in the 
presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize and the 1993 Oslo Agreement. But mythologies 
do have consequences: “(…) our own - and the world‟s - wish to see Norway as a 
peace dove is so strong that the word is made flesh.”336 Witoszek thus establishes 
„peace‟ as the centerpiece of a new national self image or mythology, and states that 
there is an interplay between this mythology and the level of practice. Her self image 
notion was at the time innovative, and it was soon followed up. In 2003, the historian 
Terje Tvedt published a major study of the Norwegian „South-policy‟ system.337 Tvedt 
here views „Norway as the world‟s leading provider of development aid‟, as „peace 
nation‟, and as „humanitarian great power‟ as denoting self images. Furthermore, he 
devotes substantial attention to the interplay between these and the „South-political 
                                            
332 Widvey, Torhild 2003; Dagbladet 2005 (5 Feb.)(quotes by State Secretary Sylvi Graham)  
333 Partly in line with my suggestions, Leira finds that the increasing interest in studying the engagement may be seen as a 
result of the activist peace promotion policy, the anniversary celebrations (the Nobel Peace Prize, Norway as a sovereign 
state) where peace has been in focus, and the beginning denaturalization of the previously obvious link between Norway 
and peace. Leira, Halvard 2005, pp. 154f 
334
 Witoszek, Nina 2002. The original title is ‘Hvis fred er problemet, er Norge løsningen?’ Witoszek is an author and was in 
2002 Professor in Culture Studies at the University of Oslo 
335
 Ibid 
336 Ibid 
337 His study is part of the Norwegian research project ‘Power and Democracy’, the biggest Norwegian social science 
research project in contemporary history. It should be noted that Tvedt also published a related analysis of how 
Norwegians’ perceptions about themselves, the world, history, and development are formed by and reproduced in 
intellectuals’ works. The study does not concern the peace engagement, but its reflexive, discourse analytic approach and 
aim of denaturalizing self images may nevertheless be seen as paving the way for a reflexive turn also in the peace 
engagement discourse. Tvedt, Terje 2002a; see also  Tvedt, Terje 2002b, Tvedt, Terje 2002c, Dagbladet 2002 (9 Jun.) 
73 
 
system‟. The self images are seen as results of this system‟s discourse,338 but it is 
underlined that they also have contributed to the development and reproduction of the 
system‟s institutional architecture.339 
The substantial media attention the study received
340
, and the resulting articulations of 
the self image notion in the Norwegian public sphere
341
, imply that the reflexive 
discursive turn was strengthened. The final report of the Power and Democracy 
study
342
, to which Tvedt contributed, pulls in the same direction:  
Since the early 1990s,”Norway” has been built up as an international brand name, as a 
particularly peace loving country, eager at donating resources and with specific tasks in 
world politics. The branding takes place through the “engagement policy” – the work for 
conflict resolution, peace, democracy, and human rights – around the world. The image 
of Norway as a moral and humanitarian great power has become a new national symbol 
on line with other symbols shaping Norwegians‟ national identity.343  
This quote unequivocally establishes the practices of conflict resolution and promotion 
of peace, democracy, and human rights, and the related image of Norway as a moral 
and humanitarian great power, as adding up to a national symbol with substantial 
effects for Norwegians‟ very identity.  
In the wake of the publishing of the report, the interest in the Norwegian peace 
tradition and engagement rose, and the self image notion gained ground. In 2004, a 
major history research project termed „The Norwegian Peace Tradition‟ was launched 
at the University of Oslo.
344
 A VG article with the telling title „Is Norway a Peace 
Nation?‟ describes the project this way:  
We hear it all the time; that Norway is a peace nation, about the country‟s long peace 
tradition. Or the politicians – and others – talk about the “heritage from Nansen.” (…) 
                                            
338 Tvedt, Terje 2003, p. 19, 24, 37, 201f, 312; see also Tvedt, Terje 2002b; Tvedt, Terje 2006 
339 Tvedt, Terje 2003, p. 305, 312; see also Tvedt, Terje 2006.  
340
 See for example Aftenposten Morgen 2003b (21 Aug.); Bergens Tidende 2005 (26 Aug.); Bistandsaktuelt 07/2003; Bladet 
Forskning 5/2003; Dag og Tid no. 34, 2003 (23 Aug.); Forskning.no 2003; Klassekampen 2003a (20 Aug.); Nyheter fra 
Makt- og demokratiutredningen 2003. 
341 Klassekampen 2003a (20 Aug.); Dag og Tid no. 34, 2003 (23 Aug.) 
342 The report summed up all the major findings in the most extensive Norwegian social science research project ever. Its 
status may be seen as contributing to the influence of its articulation of the self image notion. 
343 Norwegian Official Reports 2003, p. 51 (my translation, italics in original) 
344 The original name of the project is ”Den norske fredstradisjonen”. At the time of writing, it is still running. See 
Forskning.no 2004. For a more detailed presentation of the project, and another articulation of the self image notion, see 
Pharo, Helge 2005 
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The research project takes as its starting point the common and widespread notion of 
Norway as a peace nation (…)345  
Similar statements, underlining that „Norway is a peace nation‟ is a common and 
widespread notion, are also to be found in the introduction to scholarly articles 
focusing on the historical Norwegian peace tradition.
346
  
 In 2005, it was eventually documented that the peace nation self image retains a very 
strong position in Norway. The company in charge of Norway‟s centennial 
anniversary celebration carried out a major survey to map Norwegians‟ national self 
images. The results showed that as many as 92 percent of the asked thought that 
Norway is a humanitarian „peace prince‟ in world society. A survey in eight European 
countries about images of Norway was also carried out. The results were clear; very 
few associated Norway with humanitarian assistance and peace promotion.
347
 The 
evident discrepancy between Norwegians‟ own self images and others‟ images of us, 
and the strong position of the „peace nation‟ self image, was duly noted in the 
Norwegian press. Dagbladet delivered this statement:  “The peace nation. The world‟s 
biggest donor. Such is our self image. But the world does not agree.”348 Although not 
explicitly stating so, the focus on this discrepancy suggests that Norwegians‟ self 
image may not be entirely „realistic‟. However, it is also suggested that the „peace 
nation‟ self image has been an important and successful part of Norwegian nation 
building.349  
The 2005 centennial anniversary survey, and the reaction its results sparked, meant 
that articulations of the self image notion were presented to the general Norwegian 
public, and that the reflexive discursive turn became firmly established as part of the 
wider peace engagement discourse. In the period from 2005 to 2008, the self image 
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 VG 2005 (20 Jun.). The original title is ’Er Norge en fredsnasjon?’ See also Forskning.no 2004; Pharo, Helge 2005 
346 Leira, Halvard 2004, p. 153; Leira, Halvard 2005, pp. 135, 155; Steine, Bjørn Arne & Vogt, Carl Emil 2004, p. 17 
347 Hundreårsmarkeringen Norge 1905-2005, 2005. The results are referred in Dagbladet 2005 (5 Feb.); NTBtekst 2005 (6 
Feb.); Leira, Halvard 2005b; Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007, pp. 11, 15; Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a. A Dagbladet article 
termed ’Beautiful Cold Expensive Invisible – and Norway is actually not known for peace and development aid’ refers the 
results form the international survey. Dagbladet 2004 (21 Sept.). See also Bergens Tidende 2004 (3 Oct.) 
348
 Dagbladet 2005 (5 Feb.); for similar statements, see Bergens Tidende 2004 (3 Oct.); NTBtekst 2005 (6 Feb.)  
349 Dagbladet 2005 (5 Feb.). See also Fædrelandsvennen 2006 (17 Mar.) 
75 
 
notion was still mainly carried by scholars, but their views were increasingly 
articulated in the public sphere through newspaper articles.
350
  
Within the resulting body of texts, we may distinguish between two principal strands 
of articulations. The first constructs the self image as unrealistic, and as influencing 
the Norwegian foreign policy too heavily. The underlying starting point is that we may 
hold self images up against (an objective) reality, and thus assess the extent to which 
they correspond to truth.
351
 Janne Haaland Matlary, political scientist and former State 
Secretary, says it this way:  
My conclusion is that the doses of peace engagement proscribed by the MFA the later 
years are OK and useful, but that the image created of “Norway as a peace nation” by 
politicians, not least by the Christian Democratic Party [KrF]  and the Socialist Left Party 
[SV], is misleading and blurring. One replaces realities by normative statements with 
resonance in the people, cultivated through the peace rhetoric we find back with Løvland 
and Bjørnson. (…) the problem today is that it is way too easy to serve “peace” as the 
main content of Norwegian foreign policy, no questions asked.
352
  
In an article with the telling name „Narcissus Norwegicus‟, the historian Olav Riste 
follows up: “Peace nation and “humanitarian great power”. Norway‟s self image has 
become one of the areas highest on the priority list of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.”353 He goes on to characterize the Norwegian peace nation self image as 
„narcissistic‟.354 Both Matlary‟s and Riste‟s statements construct the  peace nation self 
image as diverting attention from realities, and as resulting in a foreign policy which 
places excessive importance on peace promotion.  
The dominant representation‟s construction of Norway as an important peace promoter 
internationally is also challenged. Terje Tvedt articulates this particularly clearly, 
stating that he wants to “shatter the myth about Norway‟s great position as a national 
peace mediator abroad”, and that “Norway has neither enough competence nor enough 
                                            
350 For articles written by or based on interviews with academics, and that articulate the self image notion, see Aftenposten 
Morgen 2007a (22 Mar.); Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a; Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007b; Bergens Tidende 2007(26 Apr.); Leira, 
Halvard 2005b, Leira, Halvard 2006; Leira, Halvard 2007; Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a; Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005b; 
Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005c; Riste, Olav 2007; Ryggvik, Helge 2006; Stavanger Aftenblad Aftenbladet 2006 (18 Feb.); 
Stavanger Aftenblad Aftenbladet 2007 (26 Apr.); von der Lippe, Berit 2007  
351 This starting point thus violates social constructivist and discourse analytic ontology, which underlines that reality is 
socially constructed and claims that there is no unmediated objective reality that humans may grasp directly. See chapter 
on theory and methodology. 
352 Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005c; see also Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005b 
353 Riste, Olav 2007 
354
 Ibid.  See also Aftenposten Morgen 2007a (22 Mar.); Toje, Asle 2008. The former article’s headline is ‘Norway has an 
unrealistic self image’, and the article is built on statements by the scholars Geir Lundestad and Asle Toje.  
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power to be termed a substantial peace factor.”355 As we have already seen, the 
concept „myth‟ may be taken to mean different things356, but in the texts in question 
here, it seems to be used in the sense that the self image is false (out of touch with 
reality).
357
 The articulations thus imply a rejection of the peace nation self image. 
The second strand of articulations is not critical to the self image per se. The texts 
articulating it may be seen as trying to denaturalize the peace nation self image by 
showing that it is not given, obvious, or natural. This project is in other words similar 
to this thesis‟ project, and it is carried out through holding the self image up against 
foreign policy practice. Iver B. Neumann‟s 2004 feature article termed „It is typically 
Norwegian to engage in war‟358 is innovative in this respect:  
How could it be that Norway, which under the Cold War often was spoken of as best in 
the NATO class, which has a blooming organization life of so-called friends of the 
defense, which because of American construction work in Northern Norway must have 
more militarily planned airports per 100 inhabitants than any other country, which is 
slower at abandoning general conscription than any other European country, which has a 
small, but stable arms industry etc. etc., at the same time may maintain a self image as 
peace friendly?
359
  
Neumann states that we, in addition to what he perceives as an exaggerated peace 
tradition, have the potential for constructing a national war tradition.
360
 He thus 
denaturalizes the peace nation self image by suggesting that self images are 
constructed, that a lot of practices are not in line with the peace nation self image, and 
that Norwegian history and practice could support also other, and radically different, 
self images.  
Halvard Leira later follows in Neumann‟s footsteps when he focuses on the use of the 
peace nation self image to legitimize Norwegian participation in military operations: 
                                            
355 Bergens Tidende 2005 (26 Aug.); for similar statements, see Aftenposten Morgen 02.04.2005 (2 Apr.) (interview with 
film maker Erling Borgen); Bergens Tidende Magasinet 2006 (9 Dec.) Jagland, Thorbjørn 2008; Klassekampen 2004 (10 
May); Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a; Toje, Asle 2008. It should be noted that Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre 
expressly addressed and rejected the claim that the peace nation self image is a myth. Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b 
356
 See for example Nina Witoszek’s statement that myths are didactic, value-laden histories about what we want to 
become. Witoszek, Nina 2002 
357
 This stands in stark contrast to the discourse analytic approach to myths and self images as heavily influencing the reality 
we live in and the definition of self interests. What is perceived as national interests depends on self images, and self 
images are thus crucial guides in our relations with the outside world. Moreover, self images are built on intersubjective 
meanings and knowledge, and we therefore have no objective basis for judging them as more or less realistic. Friis, 
Karsten 2007; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. Xvi (preface), 1, 5f; Leira, Halvard 2007; Leira, Halvard (ed.)2007, pp. 7-10  
358 The original title is ’Det er typisk norsk å krige’ 
359
 Neumann, Iver B. 2004a, p. 5; Neumann, Iver B. 2004b 
360 Neumann, Iver B. 2004a, p. 6f; Neumann, Iver B. 2004b 
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“The self image of Norway as a peace nation may make it easier to send Norwegian 
soldiers to war (…)”361 Later, in the most extensive study of Norwegian foreign policy 
self images so far
362
, he underlines that “during the 1990s, also military practices were 
to a steadily increasing extent incorporated into the self image as peace nation.”363 He 
also state that the inscription of military practices into the peace tradition may create 
tensions, but that “so far, the self image has been adjusted and widened, not 
rejected.”364 Berit von der Lippe, in an analysis of peace rhetoric and defense policy, 
comes to a similar conclusion:  
The almost taken-for-granted idea of Norway as synonymous with peace nation lives on, 
but it does not appear with the same crystal clear sheen that we can be said to have lived 
with and in for long. The symptoms of this are clear – partly because Norway the last 
years have taken part in war, partly because Norway actually participates in the US‟/ 
NATO‟s war on/ for terror, and because the once obvious therefore again and again must 
be expressed. The idea about the almost genuinely peaceful Norway is challenged.
365
 
This statement may also serve as a bridge to a general conclusion about what the 
reflexive discursive turn and the self image notion do. Their principal effect is to 
question and draw in doubt the notion that Norway is a peace nation. The result is that 
the previously obvious link between Norway and peace is denaturalized. The reflexive 
turn thus opens up for criticism of the peace engagement and the dominant 
representation. And just like von der Lippe suggests, the „obvious‟ (the link between 
„Norway‟ and „peace‟, and the dominant representation of the peace engagement), is 
articulated again and again in response.
366
 The peace engagement discourse is thus 
opened up and polarized.  
5.2 The Idealist Representation   
In the previous chapter, we saw that the criticism grounded on the idealist 
representation of the peace engagement picked up in relation to the Norwegian 
                                            
361 Stavanger Aftenblad Aftenbladet 2006 (18 Feb.) (quote by Halvard Leira). See also Leira, Halvard 2005, pp. 156f 
362
 The report ’Norwegian self images and Norwegian Foreign Policy’ (original title:’Norske selvbilder og norsk 
utenrikspolitikk’) is reflexive in its approach, and it treats ’Norway is a peace nation’ as one out of seven principal 
Norwegian foreign policy self images. Moreover, the peace nation self image is seen as dominant. The report was 
commented in several newspaper articles. See for example Bergens Tidende 2007 (26 Apr.); Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007; 
Leira, Halvard 2007; Stavanger Aftenblad Aftenbladet 2007 (26 Apr.); Støre, Jonas Gahr 2007b 
363 Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007, p. 14. Leira exemplifies this with the depicting of military operations in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq as peace operations.  
364 Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007, p. 15; see also Bergens Tidende 2007 (26 Apr.) 
365
 von der Lippe, Berit 2007 
366 For similar views, see Leira, Halvard 2005, pp. 155f; Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007, p. 16 
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military contribution to Iraq. From 2003 to 2008, the idealist representation and 
criticism remains largely unchanged. It does not challenge Norway‟s peace promotion 
per se; it rather constructs Norwegian foreign policy as not being idealistic enough. 
Like earlier, two principal strands of criticism are discernible. 
The first concentrates on the motivation behind the peace engagement.
367
 It comes 
more strongly to the fore than in the previous period, and though not as common as the 
criticism of Norwegian foreign policy practice, it is articulated by several texts. The 
historian and PRIO director Stein Tønnesson is its most prominent carrier; he for 
example states that “Norwegian profile may hurt peace efforts.”368 The peace 
promotion should, in Tønneson‟s view, be delinked from promotion of Norway:  
If the political leadership‟s need for attention on TV guides what one does, it is 
unfavorable. We have seen such tendencies earlier. (…) It is embarrassing when Norway 
uses its engagement to promote its own role. We must not become excessively focused on 
image building, and impatient for visible success.
369
  
These statements construct a link between Norwegian self interests and peace 
promotion and state that it takes the focus away from the goals of promoting peace and 
human welfare. Self interest considerations are thus discursively linked to adverse 
consequences. 
The second strand of idealist criticism is mainly concerned with what is seen as a 
discrepancy between Norway‟s peace nation image and Norway‟s foreign policy 
practice. The most commonly articulated criticism of this strand focuses on Norway‟s 
participation in offensive military operations abroad. In line with the criticism 
appearing in 2003
370
, this is constructed as incompatible with the peace nation 
image.
371
 What is new is that military engagement is also constituted as a potential 
threat to Norway‟s ability to play a third party role in peace processes:  
                                            
367
 This criticism is not entirely new, it was articulated by Thune, Henrik 1997  
368 Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a 
369
 Aftenposten Morgen 2007 (13 Oct.); see Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a for a very similar statement. Tønnesson here also 
criticizes the use of the concept ’The Norwegian Model’ and states that Norway is not better suited for peace promotion 
than many other counties. Atle Fretheim, then President in Medecines Sans Frontieres Norway, articulates a very similar 
criticism of the Norwegian use of humanitarian assistance and peace promotion as “strategic tools to achieve political 
gains” and states that this practice stands “in sharp contrast (…) to humanitarian principles and values”. Fretheim, Atle 
2003 
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 Nationen 2003 (13 Oct.); Klassekampen Morgen 2003b (17 Sept.) 
371 Aftenposten Morgen 2005e (2 Apr.); Bergens Tidende Morgen 2004 (3 Oct.); Klassekampen Morgen 2004 (10 May). 
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The peace mediator Petter Skauen in Norwegian Church Aid warns that Norwegian 
military engagement abroad may weaken Norway‟s credibility as a peace mediator. The 
entire peace engagement is based on confidence, and it is therefore important not to be 
identified with warring countries or countries exploiting the Third World economically, 
says Skauen.
372
 
Torkel Brekke similarly sees a contradiction between Norwegian security thinking, 
which underline the relationship to the US and participation in NATO operations; and 
the peace nation role. Because the latter presupposes political and moral integrity, 
participation in military operations may compromise Norway‟s work for peace and 
reconciliation.
373
 These texts thus construct a negative discursive link between 
Norway‟s ability to promote peace and Norway‟s credibility as a third party on the one 
hand, and participation in military operations on the other.  Although not explicitly 
referred to, the scholarly examination of the seeming discrepancy between the peace 
nation self image and the practice of Norwegian participation in offensive military 
operations
374
 may plausibly be seen as lending legitimacy to this construction.  
A negative link between „weapons export‟ and „peace nation‟/ „peace promotion‟ is 
also constructed. Several texts focus on tensions in the peace nation image created by 
Norway‟s weapons export and investment in the arms industry.375 A Dagbladet article 
delivers this statement: “The Socialist Left Party‟s foreign policy spokesperson Bjørn 
Jacobsen says that the extensive Norwegian weapons export weakens the image of 
Norway as a peace nation.”376 The newspaper Vårt Land similarly asks whether it is 
possible to combine the self image as peace nation with our blooming export of 
weapons, and sees a potential conflict.377 Weapons export is thus, like participation in 
military operations abroad, constructed as a practice that may weaken Norway‟s 
credibility as a peace promoter. 
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 Aftenposten Morgen 2005d (5 Feb.)  
373 Brekke, Torkel 2005; see also Larsen, Torgeir 2004 
374
 Leira, Halvard 2005; Leira, Halvard (ed.) 2007; Leira, Halvard 2007; Neumann, Iver B. 2004a; Neumann, Iver B. 2004b; 
von der Lippe, Berit 2007; see also section on reflexive turn 
375 It may also be noted that Norway’s interest based policies in the High North (Fædrelandsvennen 2006 (17 Mar.)), and 
the lack of economic support for the domestic peace movement (Kopreitan, Ole 2005), are criticized for being 
incompatible with the peace nation image.  
376 Dagbladet 2006 (21 Oct.); see also Aftenposten Morgen 2005e (2 Apr.); Klassekampen Morgen 2004 (10 May) for similar 
statements 
377 Vårt Land 2007 (8 Dec.) 
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To sum up; the idealist representation, and the basic discursive structure of the 
criticism it levels at Norwegian policy, remain largely unchanged. Nevertheless, new 
discursive constructions and links appear. Norway‟s weapons export and the danger of 
undermining Norway‟s peace engagement through confidence-wrecking participation 
in military operations are emphasized, and negative links between peace promotion 
and these practices are explicitly articulated. The idealist criticism of the Norwegian 
self interest motivation is in other words rearticulated and gains strength. It is 
nevertheless overshadowed by the realist representation, which is truly revived.  
6.3 The Revival of the Realist Representation 
Towards the end of the previous period, the realist representation appeared as more 
marginalized than ever. This state of affairs would not last long, however: the reflexive 
discursive turn, and the critical potential therein, led to its revival. New strands of 
criticism emerging and coming to the fore from 2005 and onwards were incorporated 
in it, and as a result, it was considerably widened.   
Before these changes took hold, the realist representation remained largely unchanged; 
it was primarily carried by Progress Party MPs, who drew on the familiar realist 
concepts of „concentration‟/‟prioritization and „neighboring areas‟. In parliamentary 
debates, the MPs repeatedly constructed Norwegian foreign policy as having too wide 
a focus, as focusing too much on faraway conflicts, and as de-emphasizing Norwegian 
interests, particularly in the High North. They also implicitly questioned the beneficial 
consequences of the peace engagement in terms of self interests.
378
  
Starting in 2003, new lines of criticism of the peace engagement and its dominant 
representation gradually come to the fore. Taken together, they challenge most of the 
dominant representation‟s discursive constructions and meanings. The majority of the 
articulations do not draw explicitly on the realist representation‟s key concepts, but 
they are nevertheless compatible with realist criticism.  
                                            
378 Stortingstidende 2003-2004, pp. 1651, 1663 (Morten Høglund), 1665, 1673 (Christopher Stensaker); Stortingstidende 
2004-2005a, pp. 1588f, 1607 (Morten Høglund). It should, however, be noted that in the Parliamentary Debates in 2006 
and 2007, the Progress Party MPs do not criticize the peace engagement. In 2006, MP Morten Høglund eventually de-
emphasizes his criticism and gives full support for the Norwegian peace efforts at Sri Lanka. Stortingstidende 2005-2006, 
p. 1269 
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The first strand of criticism constructs the Norwegian Model
379
 as problematic, thus 
suggesting that it may not be an advantage at all. Terje Tvedt is this criticism‟s most 
prominent carrier. In his study of the „South-political system‟, he finds that the 
Norwegian Model, with its close ties between government, NGOs, and academic 
institutions, results in an undemocratic, monolithic system that is marked by elite 
circulation, has corporative features, and that therefore hinders pluralism and debate. 
Moreover, the actors in this system have strong vested interests in the continuation and 
expansion of the Norwegian engagement, and pragmatic evaluation is, as a 
consequence, lacking.
380
  
Tvedt‟s criticism of the Norwegian Model, underlining its negative consequences, is 
referred to and rearticulated in a large number of texts.
381
 It challenges the dominant 
representation‟s inscription of meaning in the concept of „The Norwegian Model‟. 
Rather than linking it to positively laden concepts such as flexibility, competence, 
confidence, and efficiency; links to negatively laden concepts are established, and new 
meaning is created. The criticism implies that a discursive struggle about the meaning 
of „The Norwegian Model‟ ensues. The concept thus assumes the quality of a floating 
signifier, open to different inscriptions of meaning, and the position of the dominant 
representation is weakened.  
The second strand of criticism is that the Norwegian peace promotion efforts have 
brought little peace and have been inefficient. The basis for this criticism is the 
seemingly negative development in several of the peace processes Norway was 
involved in. The publishing of two major studies that suggest that Norway‟s 
involvement in the Middle East peace process benefited Israel, and that the peace 
                                            
379 The Norwegian Model is here defined as the cooperation between the government, Norwegian humanitarian NGOs, and 
academic institutions. In the dominant representation, the Norwegian Model is, in contrast, a composite category 
consisting of the notions of small state advantages; close cooperation between Norwegian authorities, NGOs, and 
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380 Tvedt, Terje 2003, see particularly pp. 26-31, 43-46, 53-197, 303-310; Tvedt, Terje 2006, pp. 70-78, 84f 
381 Aftenposten Morgen 2003a (21 Aug.); Aftenposten Morgen 2005b (4 Feb.); Bistandsaktuelt 07/2003; Bladet Forskning 
5/2003; Dagens Næringsliv 2007a (31 Mar.); Dagens Næringsliv Morgen 2007b (13 Apr.); Dag og Tid no. 34 2003 (23 Aug.); 
Forskning.no 2003; Klassekampen 2003a (20 Aug.); Nyheter fra Makt- og demokratiutredningen 2003; Toje, Asle 2007; 
Udgaard, Nils Morten 2006; Østerud, Øyvind 2006a; Østerud, Øyvind 2006b, p. 313; Østerud, Øyvind 2006c. 
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accords that resulted were no sound basis for lasting peace, supported this view.
382
 A 
more general criticism of the lack of efficiency in Norwegian peace promotion is 
explicitly articulated by political scientist Øyvind Østerud: ”Norway wants to be an 
important peace creating nation, but there are very few documented positive effects of 
our international engagement.”383 Østerud also states that we lack knowledge of the 
effects of Norwegian peace engagement, and that our involvement in conflicts in fact 
may have adverse consequences, prolonging hostilities and leading to renewed 
violence.
384
 Østerud‟s criticism are referred to and rearticulated in a number of texts385, 
and it is used as an argument in explicit articulations of the realist representation.
386
 
The criticism directly challenges one of the lynchpins of the dominant representation; 
the discursive construction of Norway‟s efforts as contributing substantially and 
effectively to peace in a number of former conflict areas.  
The third strand is related to the first and second, and concerns the alleged Norwegian 
advantages in peace promotion. It questions the notion that Norway has particular 
small state advantages. An Aftenposten article says it this way: “Innocence means 
ignorance. Our lack of knowledge about the world makes us, in many ways, badly 
suited to conducting the peace promotion (…)”387 Similarly, in a journal on 
development aid it is stated that “several researchers question the idea that Norway 
may achieve more because it is a small country.”388 Finally, a recent Dagens 
Næringsliv article with the telling title „Retired Peace Nation‟389 states that an 
“unsentimental assessment” is needed of the argument that “Norway has special 
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 Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2004; Ørum, Arne 2004; see also Ny Tid 2004 (22 May); Aftenposten Morgen 2005b (4 Feb.). 
The former article reviews the studies; in the latter Arne Ørum himself “warns against the mistakes from the Oslo 
Agreement” and states that Norway should learn of its mistakes before extending its engagement in peace processes.  
383 Østerud, Øyvind 2006c; see also Østerud, Øyvind 2006b; Østerud, Øyvind 2006a. For a similar criticism of Norwegians’ 
belief that we may accomplish a lot through our involvements in peace processes on the international scene, see 
Klassekampen 2005 (25 Aug.) 
384 Østerud, Øyvind 2006b, pp. 309-313; Østerud, Øyvind 2006c 
385 See for example Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a; Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007b; Dagens Næringsliv 2006 (7 Dec.); Dagens 
Næringsliv 2007a (31 Mar.); Dagens Næringsliv Morgen 2007b (13 Apr.); Jagland, Thorbjørn 2008; Udgaard, Nils Morten 
2006. It should also be noted that Østerud’s criticism, which also concerns aid, sparked a heated debate about Norwegian 
development assistance. For a discourse analysis of the debate, see Fretheim, Kjetil 2007. For an overview of the 
contributions, see Rorg.no 2007 
386 Udgaard, Nils Morten 2006; Toje, Asle 2008 
387 Aftenposten Morgen 2005c (5 Feb.); see also Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a (quotes by Helge Pharo and Stein Tønnesson) 
388 Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007b. Øyvind Østerud here states that Norway lacks power resources to pressure the parties, and 
Helge Pharo questions the Norwegian political and academic expertise. See also Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a; Dagens 
Næringsliv 2007a (31 Mar.) 
389 The original title is ’Pensjonert fredsnasjon’ 
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qualifications for conducting facilitation and mediation in peace processes, because of 
our history and because we, as an outside country in Europe, are particularly neutral 
and credible.”390  
The „small state advantages‟ of confidence from the parties, neutrality, and  lack of 
colonial past, great power ambitions, and hidden agendas, are thus explicitly 
questioned.
391
 Important parts of the rationale for and legitimization of the substantial 
Norwegian engagement; the assertions that Norway may contribute to peace where 
other third parties fail, and that our involvement has „added value‟; are thus 
challenged. However, we should not overestimate this effect; the criticism is 
articulated in a small number of texts and remains marginal. 
The fourth strand underlines that Norway has not benefited much in terms of self 
interest. Dagens Næringsliv writes that  
(…) there are little concrete evidence of what Norwegians have „got back‟ for their 
efforts, apart from the honor of being invited to meetings with the American Secretary of 
State or British Minister of Foreign Affairs. –Yes, we experience that our engagement 
gives access, but we are not good enough at utilizing it, says Helgesen [former State 
Secretary].392  
The same newspaper follows up with a very similar statement ten months later.393 The 
construction of the peace engagement as enabling the government to further 
Norwegian interests in unrelated areas is thus criticized; the improved access does not 
pay in terms of self interests. It should be noted, however, that this criticism also 
remains marginal; the two Dagens Næringsliv articles are the only texts in my material 
that articulate it.  
The fifth new line of criticism draws on the reflexive discursive turn, and states that 
the „peace nation‟ self image diverts attention from Norway‟s „real national interests‟. 
Janne Haaland Matlary delivers this statement: 
                                            
390
 Dagens Næringsliv 2008 (9 Jan.); see also Jagland, Thorbjørn 2008 for a similar questioning of the advantages of being a 
small ‘outsider country’. 
391 Aftenposten Morgen 2005c (5 Feb.); Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007a; Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007b; Dagens Næringsliv 2008 (9 
Jan.) 
392 Dagens Næringsliv 2007a (31 Mar.)  
393 Dagens Næringsliv 2008a (9 Jan.). The Progress Party MP Morten Høglund hints at similar criticism in the 2005 Storting 
Foreign Policy debate. Høglund states that he doubts that image building, in which peace promotion is an important part, 
is the best way of taking care of Norway’s foreign policy interests. Stortingstidende 2004-2005, p. 1588 
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In the real world, Norway‟s peace diplomacy is insignificant. (…) Nevertheless, this 
peace role is cultivated as unique and extremely important in the domestic political 
rhetoric. This blurs, prevents rational interest- and power analysis, and contributes to 
making one look at Norway with unrealistic eyes.
394
 
Nils Morten Udgaard follows suit; he suggests that “the Norwegian self image is 
twisted when we see our political mission in good deeds towards other countries” and 
claims that this weakens the understanding of Norwegian interests.
395
 These statements 
thus explicitly link the „self image notion‟ to the concepts of lack of „realism‟ and 
attention to „national interests‟, stating that the unrealistic self image is a liability 
hindering the adoption of a proper foreign policy.
396
  
Several other concepts and links are also introduced to the „realist representation‟. The 
new strands of articulations tend to use the very concepts of „realism‟ and „realistic‟/ 
„unrealistic‟ extensively.397 These concepts are discursively linked to „national 
interests‟:  
The Storting must give Norway a real-politically founded foreign policy again, if we are 
to be able to look after Norwegian interests in the international society. (…) We need 
serious politicians, not overambitious peace mediators who have forgotten the 
realpolitical challenges in our neighboring areas.
398
  
„National interests‟ are thus linked to „realism‟ and specified in opposition to an 
expansive peace engagement. Moreover, and in line with the „traditional‟ realist 
representation, they are in some texts specified as lying mainly in our neighboring 
areas, and in the High North.
399
 
The familiar realist linkage of  the Norwegian foreign policy and peace engagement to 
the concepts of „lack of prioritization‟/ „lack of focus‟ and „lack of strategic analysis‟ 
                                            
394 Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005c; see also Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a; Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005b; Riste, Olav 2007; 
Steiro, Øystein 2005. For related quotes, see section on the reflexive turn. Matlary thus went from being a staunch 
supporter of the peace engagement as State Secretary, to becoming one of its most outspoken critics. 
395 Udgaard, Nils Morten 2006; see Riste, Olav 2007; Aftenposten Morgen 2007a (22 Mar.) (builds on statements by Asle 
Toje and Geir Lundestad) for very similar statements 
396
 Again, this runs counter to the discourse analytic view of self images and identities as constitutive of self interests, and 
of self images as impossible to judge on an objective basis. Friis, Karsten 2007; Hansen, Lene 2006, pp. xvi (preface), 1, 5f; 
Leira, Halvard 2007; Leira, Halvard (ed.)2007, pp. 7-10. See also section on the reflexive turn. 
397 Aftenposten Morgen 2007a (22 Mar.); Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a, Matlary, Janne 2005c; Steiro, Øystein 2005; 
Solberg, Erna 2006 (Solberg does not criticize the peace engagement outright, but she states that it has to be based on 
‘realistic premises’); Toje, Asle 2008 
398 Steiro, Øystein 2005; see also Aftenposten Morgen 2007a (22 Mar.); Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a; Toje, Asle 2008 
399 Aftenposten Morgen 2007a (22 Mar.) ; Steiro, Øystein 2005. Toje gives this a twist: he state that we must concentrate on 
our relation to the ones that “actually matters to us: Russia, the US, and the EU.” Toje, Asle 2008. See Udgaard, Nils 
Morten 2006 for a similar view. 
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also comes strongly to the fore.
400
 The Progress Party shows that this link may also be 
articulated as part of harsh criticism of the peace engagement: 
The Progress Party thinks Norway has taken on way too many peace and democracy 
missions. Therefore, the Progress Party makes major cuts in the budget [the Party‟s 
alternative budget proposal]. - In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, peace mediation has 
been cultivated almost as a sport. It has gone way too far (…) -Norway may take on 
missions from time to time, but it must be in prioritized areas. Now we are involved in 
too much.
401
  
Taken together, these discursive developments strengthen the realist representation 
substantially. Its criticism is sharpened; where the focus previously was on criticizing 
the lack of prioritization of Norwegian self interests, the dominant representation and 
the peace engagement are now to an increasing extent explicitly attacked. Moreover, 
the criticism is much more broad-based than earlier; it now challenges most of the key 
discursive constructions and organizing concepts of the dominant representation. The 
number of articulations also rises, and the realist representation may thus be seen as 
mounting a real challenge to the preponderance of the dominant representation.  
6.4 Reproduction of the Dominant Representation 
As we have now seen, the peace engagement and its dominant representation face 
criticism on a larger scale, on a broader array of issues, and from more actors than in 
earlier periods. Here, I analyze how the dominant representation is reproduced in face 
of the challenges, and how the criticism is countered. The dominant representation has 
been presented in detail in previous chapters, and when analyzing it here, I mainly 
focus on the strength and clarity of the reproduction of its main concepts and 
discursive constructions, and on the minor changes that appear. 
6.4.1 Norway is a peace nation 
Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik remained this discursive construction‟s most 
prominent carrier during his time in office.
402
 Through his many articulations, it 
                                            
400 Aftenposten 2007a (22 Mar.); Solberg, Erna 2006; Steiro, Øystein 2005; Toje, Asle 2008. For an explicit 
articulation of the link between lack of strategic analysis and the Norwegian emphasis on humanitarian assistance 
and peace promotion, see Matlary, Janne Haaland 2005a 
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 Dagbladet 2006c (6 Dec.) (built on statements by MP Morten Høglund) 
402 Bondevik, Kjell Magne 2004a; Bondevik, Kjell Magne 2004b; Bondevik, Kjell Magne 2005a; Bondevik, Kjell Magne 2005b 
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gradually became rooted, and the new coalition government
403
 that assumed office in 
2005 adopted it. It is articulated in the government declaration
404
, at the official web 
pages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
405
, by MPs belonging to the parties in 
position
406
, and by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre.
407
 In one of 
his speeches, Støre underlines Norway‟s systematic international peace policy, this 
policy‟s broad public support, the traditions of solidarity and compassion, and the 
Norwegian NGOs‟ expertise in and commitment to peace promotion, as supporting the 
view that Norway is a peace nation.
408
 However, he rejects as a myth the view that the 
Norwegian people is particularly peaceful or peace-loving.
409
 This may be seen as 
suggesting that it is mainly the practice of substantial peace engagement that makes 
Norway a peace nation.
410
 Our identity as a peace nation is thus discursively 
constructed as dependent on confirmation through active efforts. If the peace nation 
identity is seen as worth holding on to, this discursive construction amounts to a 
powerful defense of an activist peace promotion policy.  
6.4.2 The peace engagement is an important part of the foreign policy  
Closely related to the peace nation concept are the discursive constructions of 
Norway‟s peace engagement as extensive, and as an important and prioritized part of 
Norway‟s foreign policy. These constructions are continuously reproduced. The 
Government generally treats peace promotion as one of the major tracks of Norway‟s 
foreign policy, and it is repeatedly underlined that the efforts have been and will be 
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 The new government consisted of the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party, and the Centre Party 
404 Arnstad, Marit; Djupedal, Øystein; Haga, Åslaug; Halvorsen, Kristin; Solberg, Hill-Marta; Stoltenberg, Jens 2005, p. 5, see 
also p. 4. The Government declaration (usually referred to as the Soria Moria Declaration) is the general framework for 
the Government’s policies, and is the most authoritative description of what the Government wants to focus on. Here, it 
is also noteworthy that the Socialist Left Party in the 2005 election campaign repeatedly expressed a wish to cultivate 
Norway’s role as a peace nation. See Halvorsen, Kristin 2005; NTBtekst 2004 (31 Oct.) (‘The Socialist Left Party wants to 
cultivate Norway’s role as peace nation’); Stortingstidende 2004-2005b, p. 1591; Solhjell, Bård Vegar 2004 
405 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008a  
406
 Stortingstidende 2005-2006, pp. 1290f; Stortingstidende 2006-2007, pp. 1964f 
407 Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2007a  
408 Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b. This may be seen as a rejection of the allegations that the peace nation self image amounts to 
a myth, as articulated in Aftenposten Morgen 2005e (2 Apr.); Bergens Tidende 2005 (26 Aug.); Klassekampen 2004 (10 
May) 
409 Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b 
410
  The Government’s wish to strengthen the Norwegian efforts may be seen as pointing in the same direction. Arnstad, 
Marit; Djupedal, Øystein; Haga, Åslaug; Halvorsen, Kristin; Solberg, Hill-Marta; Stoltenberg, Jens 2005, p. 5 
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intensified.
411
 The Parliament, with the partly exception of the Progress Party MPs
412
, 
throughout the period actively supported the activist peace engagement.
413
 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs‟ presentation of a strategic framework for Norway‟s role 
in peace building
414, and the choice of „Norway as a partner in peace and development‟ 
as one of three main themes of the official international program of Norway‟s 
Centennial Anniversary
415
, are also interesting in this respect; they add strength to the 
discursive construction of the peace engagement as extensive and important, and as 
something Norway wishes to emphasize and communicate to the world.  
6.4.3 The Norwegian Model: the Norwegian approach and its advantages 
Although relatively few texts use the concept „the Norwegian Model‟ explicitly416, the 
construction of the Norwegian approach to peace and reconciliation as distinct is a 
commonly articulated discursive element.
417
 It is also repeatedly asserted that Norway 
is well qualified or in a particularly good position to give contributions to conflict 
resolution and peace in many conflicts.
418
 The established discursive construction of 
the Norwegian approach is by and large reproduced, and due to the large number of 
clear articulations, it indeed appears as strengthened.  
                                            
411 Arnstad, Marit; Djupedal, Øystein; Haga, Åslaug; Halvorsen, Kristin; Solberg, Hill-Marta; Stoltenberg, Jens 2005, p. 6; 
Petersen, Jan 2005b; Petersen, Jan 2005c; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004a, Introduction; Støre, Jonas 
Gahr 2006a; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2007a  
412 See section on the ’realist representation’ 
413 Recommendation from the Foreign Policy Committee (Innst. S) no. 93, 2004-2005, p. 13; Stortingstidende 2003-2004; 
Stortingstidende 2004-2005b; Stortingstidende 2005-2006; Stortingstidende 2006-2007; see also Stortingstidende 2004-
2005a. It should be noted that despite its stated importance, peace promotion is no major theme in the parliamentary 
foreign policy debates. This may be taken to suggest that the policy have so broad support that it is uncontroversial, and 
that it therefore are not subject to political debate. 
414 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004a. (‘Strategic framework: the development policy’s contribution to 
peace building – Norway’s role’). Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004b (White Paper no. 35, 2003-2004) 
which concerns the fight against poverty, builds on and refers to this strategic framework in its treatment of war, conflict, 
and peace building.  
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 Bondevik, Kjell Magne 2003b; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003; Petersen, Jan 2004c; Petersen, Jan 
2005a;  Widvey, Torhild 2003. 
416
 Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007c; Aftenposten Morgen 2007b (13 Oct.); Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008a. 
These texts use the concept to denote the total Norwegian approach, not only the Government – NGO cooperation. 
417 Aftenposten Morgen 2005a (3 Feb.); Aftenposten Morgen 2007b (13 Oct.);  Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007c; Petersen, Jan 
2004b, Petersen, Jan 2005b; Petersen, Jan 2005c;Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008a; Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b; NTBtekst 2004 (31 Oct.); Solhjell, Bård Vegar 2004, Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b; Støre, 
Jonas Gahr 2006c; Widvey, Torhild 2003 
418
 Solhjell, Bård Vegar 2004, Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006a; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2007a;  Støre, Jonas Gahr 
& Solheim, Erik 2007 
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Small state advantages, such as Norway‟s lack of colonial past419, vested interests/ 
hidden agendas
420
, and power to pressure the parties into compliance
421
; and the 
country‟s alleged neutrality or impartiality422; are all seen as enabling the peace 
engagement and increasing the parties‟ confidence in Norway as a third party. So is 
the close cooperation between Norwegian authorities and humanitarian NGOs. The 
NGOs‟ networks, experience, and long-term presence are constructed as giving 
goodwill and access to parties.
423
 Some texts also construct Norway‟s role as a third 
party as a continuation of its efforts in humanitarian assistance and development aid.
424
 
Norway‟s long-term perspective and the consistency of the Norwegian policy, based 
on wide domestic political consensus, are also presented as distinguishing features of 
the Norwegian approach.
425
 The resulting Norwegian strategy of supporting peace 
efforts with development aid and humanitarian assistance is seen as key both to 
success and to Norway‟s popularity as a third party.426 The nature of the Norwegian 
role is similarly underlined. Some texts emphasize the willingness to establish 
dialogue with all parties.
427
 It is also heavily underlined that Norway is a facilitator, 
not a mediator; a „peace helper‟ rather than a peace maker. The responsibility for 
making peace thus rests with the parties, not with Norway.
428
 This concept may be 
seen as a defense against criticism of lacking results in the Norwegian peace efforts; 
Norway can not be blamed if the parties do not want peace. 
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Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004a; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008a; Solhjell, Bård Vegar 
2004; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b 
427 Aftenposten Morgen 2007b (13 Oct.); Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008a; Royal Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2008b; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b; Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006c 
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 Aftenposten Morgen 2005a (3 Feb.); Aftenposten Morgen 2007b (13 Oct.); Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007c; Petersen, Jan 
2005b; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008a; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b 
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The only innovation in the specification of „the Norwegian Model‟ seems to be the 
emphasis on Norway‟s good relationship to central international actors such as the 
US and the EU. It is heavily underlined that cooperation and coordination with other 
international actors are important in the Norwegian approach, and that Norway often 
supports the efforts of another lead actor.
429
 This may again be interpreted as a 
discursive defense against potential criticism; it suggests that the Norwegian efforts 
are pragmatically geared towards achieving results, and that they are not exclusively 
motivated by a wish to profile and promote Norway internationally.  
6.4.4 The relationship between peace promotion and development aid 
This link is no major theme in the articulations of the dominant representation; it is 
included because it is subject to interesting discursive developments. After the 1993-
1997 period‟s discursive upgrading of the concepts of „peace‟ and „peace promotion‟, 
the relationship between „peace promotion‟ and „development aid‟ was not explicitly 
laid out. This changed in 2004, with the presentation of the Government‟s strategic 
framework for the development policy‟s contribution to peace building: 
The goal of participation in international conflict management is not only to prevent and 
stop acts of war and to help victims. The overriding goal is to contribute to lasting and 
stable peace in and between states. When the peace efforts succeed, it is often a result of 
a linking of political means/ instruments, humanitarian aid, and long-term economic 
development cooperation. This suggests that our foreign policy towards conflict-torn 
countries and regions should be holistic – with the development policy as an important 
and integrated means.
430
 
  
Here, the development policy is explicitly treated as a means in peace promotion. It is 
also stated that „contribution to peace‟ should be the ultimate goal. This may be 
interpreted as a considerable discursive innovation, establishing „peace‟ alone as the 
privileged sign around which the discourse is organized, and relegating „development‟ 
to the subordinate category of means. However, the privileging of peace over 
development is not consistent throughout the text; the conventional treatment of the 
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two categories as mutually dependent and equally important goals is rearticulated.
431
 
This also holds for the White Paper on development policy presented in 2004.
432
  
Despite the return to the conventional discursive juxtaposition of „peace promotion‟ 
and „development aid‟, the strategic framework left an imprint. Development aid was 
increasingly treated as a tool to be actively used in a holistic approach to peace 
promotion, and coordination of the two policy areas was considered important.
433
  
Kristin Halvorsen, the Socialist Left Party leader, is for example quoted saying that 
Norwegian aid efforts should be geared towards prevention of war and conflict.
434
 
Moreover, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre and Minister of International 
Development Erik Solheim underline that “Norwegian efforts for peace and 
reconciliation are a strategic basic investment to create conditions that make the 
fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals possible.”435 The necessity of peace 
and security for development to take place is stressed, and it is argued that Norway 
may contribute more to development by strengthening its peace efforts than by 
focusing on traditional development assistance.
436
 These statements suggest that peace 
promotion is regarded as even more important than previously. 
6.4.5 The motivation for the engagement  
During the period in question here, the existing discursive construction of motivation 
is by and large reproduced, and no major discursive innovations appear. Nevertheless, 
the emphasis seems to change somewhat; towards the end of the period, the 
instrumentalist perspective apparently loses ground. 
In the first part of the period, the beneficial consequences of the peace engagement, in 
terms of Norwegian self interests, were heavily underlined. The instrumentalist 
                                            
431 Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004a, p. 10 
432 Ibid, pp. 17,177 
433 Ibid; Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004b, pp. 17, 177; Recommendation from the Foreign Policy Committee (Innst. S) 
no. 93, 2004-2005, pp. 2, 13 
434 NTBtekst 2004 (31 Oct.) 
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 Støre, Jonas Gahr & Solheim, Erik 2007 
436 Ibid; see also Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b 
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perspective is articulated in newspaper articles
437
 and in texts expressing the 
Government‟s views alike.438 Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre says it this 
way:  
Norwegian governments find – yes, I find myself – that our involvement in peace 
processes can be a ticket to gain political attention for other issues. We must not waste the 
opportunities this offers.
439
 
However, Støre is ambivalent to self interested motivations; he for example states that 
this approach “must be handled with great care” and that “we should not, we cannot 
use our participation in peace efforts to sell Norwegian salmon.”440 Towards the end of 
the period, this ambivalence comes to the fore. In an interview in 2007, the head of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Section for Peace and Reconciliation states that “Norway‟s 
work [for peace] has made us a more interesting partner for a lot of countries, but for 
us, this is a side effect and not a motivation.”441 Similarly, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs delivers this statement:  
Norway uses more than NOK 800 million per year on peace efforts. These funds must 
never be seen as important in promoting our reputation and winning international 
prestige.
442
 
Viewed together with the fact that few clear articulations of the instrumentalist 
perspective appears towards the end of the period
443
, these statements suggest that pure 
self interested considerations now have lost some of their legitimacy as a motivational 
factor.  
Morale, values, duty to help, and the wish to do good are still heavily underlined as 
motivation for the peace engagement, particularly in the parliamentary debates,
444
 and 
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 Aftenposten Morgen 2005b (4 Feb.) (built on statements by scholar Sverre Lodgaard); Larsen, Torgeir 2004. The former 
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 Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b. 
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altruism thus remains an important part of the dominant representation. However, in 
terms of discursive developments, another motivational factor is more interesting. 
Security comes even more strongly to the fore than previously, particularly in texts 
emanating from the Government
445
, but also in the parliamentary debates.
446
 Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre says it this way: 
Our peace policy is becoming part of our security policy. The security aspect alone is 
sufficient justification for our peace policy. It is also the most important justification.
447
  
The prominence of security considerations is here clearly established. Like the 
instrumentalist perspective, such considerations are ultimately about beneficial 
consequences for Norway. The difference between the two lies in the view of security 
as indivisible: by improving others‟ security, we improve our own and vice versa. This 
is not the case with other self interests: improving our international standing and 
influence, and furthering commercial interests, are beneficial only to ourselves.  
Finally, from a discourse analytic perspective it is interesting that the motivation 
behind the peace engagement continues to be an important theme in the dominant 
representation. This may be taken to mean that the peace engagement has to be 
explicitly legitimized, and that it is therefore not firmly established as a natural or 
taken-for-granted part of Norwegian foreign policy. The opening of the discourse, and 
the mounting challenges to the peace engagement, support this interpretation. 
6.4.6 Direct countering of criticism 
The dominant representation in itself amounts to a powerful discursive defense of 
Norway‟s peace engagement. It discursively constructs Norway as a peace nation that 
has particular qualifications in peace promotion and a moral duty to assist. Norway‟s 
approach is constructed as distinct, effective, and strategic; and the peace engagement 
is established as an integral part of the foreign policy that is beneficial when viewed 
                                                                                                                                        
Recommendation from the Foreign Policy Committee (Innst. S) no. 93, 2004-2005, p. 2; Royal Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2004b, p. 6.  
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1267 (Olav Akselsen, A); Stortingstidende 2006-2007, p. 1965 (Signe Øye, A) 
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 Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006b; see also Støre, Jonas Gahr 2006a; Dagbladet 2006b (6 Dec.). In the latter text, Støre claims that 
the Progress Party’s proposed cuts in the peace promotion efforts “makes the world a more dangerous place”  
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from a self interest perspective. If these constructions are accepted, the peace 
engagement appears as natural and necessary.  
Nevertheless, we have seen that criticism of the peace engagement and its dominant 
representation now come more strongly to the fore. Some of this criticism is explicitly 
countered by carriers of the dominant representation. This may be taken as an 
indication of discursive struggle, and as suggesting that the position of the dominant 
representation appeared as threatened. Here, I briefly present the counter criticism. 
In the wake of Øyvind Østerud‟s criticism of the Norwegian efforts in development 
aid and peace promotion
448
, several texts appeared asserting that the engagement 
indeed gives results. In a feature article simply termed „The engagement helps‟449, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre and Minister of International 
Development Erik Solheim deliver this statement: “For us, it is clear: Norwegian and 
international efforts have given results (…)”450 Also actors outside the political 
leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulate a similar defense of the peace 
engagement. When former Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorbjørn Jagland in January 
2008 stated that “close to all the peace processes we have been involved in, now lie in 
ruins”451, he was met with quite massive criticism. Former State Secretary Jan Egeland 
is quoted in Bergens Tidende: 
He lists a lot of peace processes around the globe where both he and other Norwegians 
can be given the credit for concrete peace agreements that has saved tens of thousands of 
human lives.
452
 
All the above mentioned articulations defend the peace engagement quite 
straightforwardly by stating that it works and that it has given results. They may thus 
be seen as aiming at reestablishing the positive link between „Norwegian peace 
promotion‟ and „peace‟.  
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 Østerud, Øyvind 2006a; Østerud, Øyvind 2006b; Østerud, Øyvind 2006c 
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 Støre, Jonas Gahr & Solheim, Erik 2006; for very similar statements, see Bistandsaktuelt 09/2007c (interview with Johan 
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452 Bergens Tidende 2008 (13 Jan.); see also Aftenposten Morgen 2008 (5 Jan.)  (statements by Labor Party MP Olav 
Akselsen). Egeland mentions Guatemala, South Sudan, Mali, and the Middle East as peace processes where Norway has 
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Another line of defense is more subtle: it underlines that peace promotion is difficult, 
and that the obvious successes may be far between. It may nevertheless save human 
lives or contribute positively, and it must therefore be continued.
453
  Scholar Kjetil 
Skogrand says it this way:  
It is far between the spectacular successes, but we cannot disregard the fact that the 
conditions in the relevant areas could have been far worse without Norwegian efforts. We 
can therefore not afford to let be [discontinue our involvement].
454
  
By asserting that the engagement may have major but non-measurable positive 
consequences in terms of human welfare, the criticism against the engagement is 
delegitimized and effectively countered. 
Carriers of the dominant representation also attempt at countering the criticism leveled 
at The Norwegian Model for being undemocratic and stifling debate and critical 
evaluation.
455
 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International 
Development articulate this defense: 
In Norway, the competence and knowledge level is high as a result of our engagement, 
and it is distributed among the authorities, organizations, research institutes, and others. 
Criticism and analysis exist; that is positive, and we get a stream of feedback precisely 
from these organizations.
456
 
Moreover, it is repeatedly underlined that the Norwegian efforts are continuously 
assessed to make them better and more efficient. Good intentions are not enough; it is 
necessary to focus on efficiency in the peace efforts.
457
 It is also conceded that critical 
perspectives, pluralism and debate are necessary.
458
 This suggests that critical 
evaluations are already carried out, and that the system indeed is open.  
Finally, the Progress Party view that the peace engagement is too expensive, and that 
the funding therefore should be reduced
459
, are explicitly countered in several texts. 
Former State Secretary Jan Egeland criticizes the Progress Party‟s view of the costs, 
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 Aftenposten Morgen 2008 (5 Jan.); Bergens Tidende 2008 (13 Jan.); Johansen, Raymond 2007; Støre, Jonas Gahr & 
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stating that the peace engagement has been relatively cheap.
460
 Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre mounts a more comprehensive defense of the engagement. In 
a Dagbladet article termed „Progress Party cuts make the world more dangerous‟461, he 
is cited saying that the proposed budget cuts “give a dramatic signal of a break with 
Norway‟s role as peace nation”, and that they “do something with our reputation.”462 
Moreover, he also states that the peace engagement gives results, and that if the cuts 
are carried out, it would lead to weakened security for Norway.
463
  
These statements amount to a powerful discursive defense of the peace engagement. 
They draw on the notion of „peace nation‟, constructing it as being dependent on an 
active international role and relatively large budget allocations. Cuts in these would, in 
other words, threaten the very image and identity of the nation. The articulation of the 
security perspective, linking international peace promotion to increased security for 
Norway, also works to defend the engagement. In line with this, budget cuts would not 
only damage our reputation, it would also be dangerously counterproductive in terms 
of vital self interests. 
6.5 Summary: Discursive Opening, Discursive Struggle? 
The analysis shows that the peace engagement discourse is opened in the period from 
2003 to 2008. The reflexive turn, through which the „peace nation‟ concept becomes 
established as a self image, paves the way for a different view of the Norwegian peace 
efforts and leads to increased attention. There are two principal strands of reflexivity; 
the first argues that the self image is a myth, out of touch with reality, the other 
attempts at denaturalizing the self image and investigating its relation to practice. 
Taken together, they have the effect of opening the discourse. In their wake, new 
strands of criticism that challenge the dominant representation are thus articulated. As 
a result, the alternative realist representation, criticizing the peace engagement for 
taking away attention from Norway‟s „real interests‟, is widened and strengthened. 
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The idealist representation, which asserts that the dominant representation focuses too 
much on self interests and too little on the ideals implicit in Norway‟s role as peace 
nation, is also present, but it remains largely unchanged. 
Despite the increasing criticism, the dominant representation is by no means dethroned 
from its position of prominence. It appears as stable; its main discursive elements are 
the same as in earlier periods, and only minor innovations and changes appear.  The 
number of texts reproducing it is very high compared to the number of „critical‟ texts. 
The dominant representation is also laid out in explicit detail; the clarity of many of 
the articulations of its main elements is notable in this respect. It should also be kept in 
mind that the peace engagement has very broad political support. The Progress Party is 
the only major political party that is critical; the other actors actively support it and 
articulate the dominant representation. The dominant representation therefore 
continues to be the main provider of the lenses through which Norwegians view the 
Norwegian peace engagement; its organization of reality is preponderant.
464
 
However, the massive scale on which the dominant representation is reproduced may 
also, from a discourse analytic point of view, be interpreted as a sign of weakness. The 
repeated articulations of its main elements and constructions mean that these are not 
completely naturalized or taken for granted; they must be reproduced to be confirmed. 
Moreover, the criticism leveled at the peace engagement is apparently not entirely 
negligible. The number of texts articulating alternative representations and criticism is 
not very large, but the texts get a lot of public attention and cause a lot of „noise‟.465 
Particularly towards the end of the period, the criticism is fiercely countered. This 
suggests that the criticism is a threat to the dominant representation‟s position, and that 
an element of discursive struggle has made its entry. In line with this, it is plausible to 
view the discourse as more open now than earlier, and the peace engagement as more 
open to different inscriptions of meaning. 
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7 Conclusion: Discourse as an Important Precondition 
for the Peace Engagement. 
In this thesis, I have presented a broad, empirically based analysis of the Norwegian 
peace engagement discourse from the early 1990s and up to 2008. The thesis revolves 
around the basic research questions: How has the Norwegian peace engagement policy 
been made possible? And how has it been constructed as a natural and important part 
of Norwegian foreign policy? My analysis is based on discourse analytic theory and 
methodology, and it is geared towards uncovering structures of specific, discursively 
constructed intersubjective understandings and meanings. The goal has in other words 
been to study the peace engagement discourse, its evolution, and its effects, and to 
investigate whether the discourse has been an important precondition for the activist 
Norwegian peace promotion policy. 
7.1 Empirical Findings 
The first analysis chapter concerns the period prior to 1993. It presents the historical 
Norwegian peace tradition, and then briefly analyses the position of peace and peace 
promotion in the relevant Government White Papers that were presented in the years 
prior to 1993. Jan Egeland‟s study “Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State” is also 
analyzed. 
The main finding here is that „peace‟ is a concept with a particular resonance in 
Norwegian foreign policy thinking, and that the existing foreign policy and 
development aid discourses articulated concepts and links that may be seen as 
conductive to the adoption of a more activist peace promotion policy. The Norwegian 
exceptionalism, the positive assessments of Norway‟s ability to contribute to the 
solution of global challenges, the comprehensive notion of security, the compatibility 
of self interests and altruism, and the link between development and peace, may all be 
seen as discursive resources that influenced Norwegians‟ view of the event of the 
Middle East peace process, and that could be drawn upon in the construction of a 
distinct peace engagement discourse.  
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However, the White Papers do not regard peace engagement as an area where Norway 
has any particular competence, and no explicit strategy for peace promotion is devised. 
Peace and peace promotion is generally subsumed under the heading of development 
aid and humanitarian assistance, and as concepts, they assume a subordinate position 
within the discourse. Peace thus remained more of a utopian goal than a practical goal, 
although this seemed to change gradually towards the end of the period. 
Chapter two details and analyzes the profound discursive changes in the wake of the 
revelation of Norway‟s participation in the Middle East peace process. The newspaper 
coverage of the Norwegian efforts is detailed before I turn to texts emanating from the 
Government. My main argument here is that the event of the Middle East peace 
process and its discursive construction were very important in the adoption of the 
activist peace engagement, and in the establishment of a distinct peace engagement 
discourse.  
The media coverage
466
 discursively constructed the „Oslo Accords‟ as a major success 
for Norway‟s peace diplomacy. Norway‟s contribution in the peace process was stated 
to be decisive, and Norway was thereby invested with considerable agency as a third 
party. It was also established that the Norwegian approach to peace promotion was 
distinct, and that Norway benefited, in terms of self interests, from the positive 
attention it got. The most significant discursive innovation was nevertheless the 
generalization of the notion that Norway may be an efficient third party in peace 
processes.  This construction of Norway as able to contribute effectively and 
decisively may plausibly be seen as a sine qua non for the subsequent activist peace 
efforts. Together with the other concepts and constructions, it made up the basic 
discursive preconditions for the adoption of the Norwegian peace engagement. 
I also argue that the newspaper coverage brought a distinct peace engagement 
discourse into being. This discourse drew on discursive resources from the historical 
peace tradition or peace discourse, the foreign policy discourse, and the development 
aid discourse, but its main object was different; it concerned Norway‟s active and 
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concrete efforts to further peace in conflict areas. The importance that was attributed to 
this new foreign policy practice is apparent in the upgrading of „peace‟ to a concrete 
foreign policy goal discursively juxtaposed to „development‟.467 Moreover, the new 
discourse‟s nodal points were different from the existing discourses‟. The peace 
engagement discourse centered on the concepts of „peace‟, „peace promotion‟, „foreign 
policy‟, and „Norway‟s interests‟. The latter three of these may be seen as the 
discourse‟s floating signifiers; its representations468 all tried to inscribe them with 
different meanings and create different links between them. Implying that the 
representations shared a set of basic concepts, the existence of such floating signifiers 
supports the interpretation that a new, distinct discourse had come into being. 
The new discourse appears as highly structured and stable. The analysis of official 
texts shows that the concepts and discursive elements established in the newspaper 
coverage were by and large reproduced, officially sanctioned, and thus invested with 
legitimacy. The constructions of Norway‟s efforts as important contributions to peace; 
of the peace promotion as an important part of the foreign policy; of the Norwegian 
approach as distinct and efficient; and of the peace engagement as motivated by both 
altruism and self interests
469
, were continuously reproduced. Together, they added up 
to a dominant representation; a particular organization of reality and a predominant set 
of lenses through which the peace engagement was viewed. This dominant 
representation implied a very positive view of Norway‟s peace efforts, and it defended, 
naturalized and legitimized them as an important and necessary part of Norway‟s 
foreign policy, worth spending substantial resources on. The strong position of this 
representation may therefore be seen as a precondition for the adoption and 
continuation of the engagement.  
The dominant representation and the meanings it inscribed the peace engagement with 
were, despite their preponderance, not hegemonic. Towards the end of the period, an 
alternative representation of the Norwegian peace engagement, which I have termed 
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the realist representation, emerged. It was organized around the concepts of „real 
interests‟, „neighboring areas‟, and „concentration‟/ „prioritization‟, and it  constructed 
the peace engagement as taking attention away from what ought to be the foreign 
policy‟s most important task: taking care of national interests, predominantly in the 
neighboring areas. As such, it promoted criticism of the peace efforts. 
While the years from 1993 to 1997 were marked by major discursive innovations, the 
1997 to 2003 period mainly saw consolidation and stability. The dominant 
representation was continuously reproduced, its position remained strong, and it thus 
laid the basis for the peace engagement‟s expansion and systematization. Its nodal 
points and discursive constructions remained largely unchanged, with some minor 
modifications: The features of the Norwegian approach to peace promotion were 
elaborated on, and the concept of „the Norwegian Model‟ gained ground. Moreover, 
the instrumentalist perspective, focusing on the beneficial consequences in terms of 
Norwegian self interest of the peace engagement, was strengthened.  
The only true innovation within the dominant representation was Prime Minister Kjell 
Magne Bondevik‟s repeated assertion that „Norway is a peace nation‟. Explicitly 
linking the peace engagement to Norwegian national identity, it had the effect of 
essentializing the peace promotion – making it a defining feature of Norwegian 
identity. It follows that the peace engagement is a natural and necessary part of 
Norway‟s foreign relations. Moreover, Bondevik stated that the peace engagement is a 
century-old historic legacy with roots in Norway‟s Christian culture and Fridtjof 
Nansen‟s humanitarian efforts. He thus constructed continuity, linking the current 
engagement to Norway‟s history. Taken together, these discursive constructions 
amounted to a powerful discursive defense of the peace promotion efforts.
470
 
Alternative representations nevertheless existed. The realist representation changed 
little; it continued to challenge the dominant representation and criticize the peace 
engagement on basis of the discursive constructions identified above. However, it was 
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weakened towards the end of the period. The Conservative Party, which had been one 
of the realist representation‟s most important carriers, changed its position and started 
to articulate the dominant representation when it became part of the Government in 
2001.  
The period also saw the emergence of a second alternative representation. This was 
essentially positive towards the peace engagement, but it wanted it to be more 
idealistic. Hence the name: the idealist representation. It supported two strands of 
criticism; the first constructed the goal of peace promotion as incompatible with the 
dominant representation‟s focus on Norwegian self interests, the other constructed 
Norway‟s foreign policy practice as out of line with the peace nation image. This 
representation gradually gained ground, particularly in relation to the Iraq war in 2003. 
Stability and consolidation were succeeded by considerable discursive change in the 
years from 2003 to 2008. The peace engagement discourse took a reflexive turn; the 
notion that „Norway is a peace nation‟ was increasingly constructed as a self image 
and treated as such. In itself, this meant that the previously obvious link between 
„peace engagement‟ and „Norway‟ was gradually denaturalized. It also led to increased 
attention to the peace engagement, and the number of texts concerned with it rose 
considerably. 
In the wake of these discursive developments, the realist representation made a 
remarkable comeback. It was widened to include a broad array of criticism. The peace 
nation self image was seen as out of touch with reality, preventing us from seeing the 
world with realistic eyes; the peace promotion was regarded as inefficient or 
counterproductive; Norway‟s alleged advantages in peace promotion were questioned; 
„the Norwegian Model‟ was seen as undemocratic and corporative in nature, hindering 
critical evaluation; and finally, the construction of the engagement as beneficial from a 
self interest perspective was called into question. Together with the assertion that the 
peace engagement takes attention away from Norway‟s „real interests‟, and thus 
prevents the adoption of a „realist‟ foreign policy, these criticisms challenged most of 
the dominant representation‟s basic discursive constructions. 
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The idealist representation, as opposed to the realist representation, remained largely 
unchanged. Its carriers articulated the same kind of criticism as earlier, viewing the 
peace nation self image as incommensurable with self interested motivations and 
foreign policy practices of weapons export and participation in military operations. 
The only minor innovation seemed to be the construction of negative links between 
Norway‟s ability to contribute constructively in peace processes on the one hand, and 
weapons export, military engagement, and the use of the peace engagement to improve 
Norway‟s international standing on the other. 
In face of the mounting challenges, and the opening of the discourse, the dominant 
representation was by and large upheld and reproduced. Only minor modifications 
appeared. What is notable is that some of the realist criticism of the peace engagement 
was directly countered. It was repeatedly stated that the engagement indeed give 
results, that the Norwegian Model does not hinder critical evaluations, and that 
reducing the funding for the peace engagement will have grave consequences. 
In many ways, the dominant representation of the peace engagement appeared stronger 
than ever. The number of texts articulating it was far larger than the number 
articulating the alternative representations, many of the articulations were very clear, 
and the peace engagement had broad political support
471
. The dominant representation 
thus continued to be the main provider of the lenses through which Norwegians saw 
the peace engagement. However, this representation‟s massive reproduction, and the 
direct countering of criticism, may also be interpreted as signs of discursive struggle; 
the peace engagement was open to different inscriptions of meaning, the dominant 
representation‟s organization of reality was contested, and it was therefore necessary 
to continuously rearticulate and actualize its basic discursive structures.
472
 
The analysis of the empirical material has given a broad overview of the peace 
engagement discourse and its evolution. It has also showed that the dominant 
representation of the peace efforts has had distinct effects.  It has provided a positive 
view of the activist Norwegian policy. It has inscribed Norway with considerable 
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agency and ability to contribute to peace. It has established the view that Norway, by 
utilizing „the Norwegian Model‟, may contribute in a unique way. It has given a 
rationale for the engagement; in addition to helping others, we help ourselves. And it 
has linked the peace engagement to the very Norwegian national identity. In other 
words; if we accept the dominant representation, the peace engagement appears as a 
natural and necessary part of Norway‟s foreign policy, and using substantial resources 
on it seems entirely sensible.  
On the basis of these findings, we may give an answer to the basic research questions. 
The activist Norwegian peace promotion has been made possible by the particular 
discursive construction we find in its dominant representation, and by this 
representation‟s continuous reproduction and dominance. This representation has also 
naturalized and in periods depoliticized the peace engagement. Without the effects of 
the representation, we have reason to doubt that it would be possible to sustain and 
expand the peace efforts. This is not to say that the dominant representation was both 
necessary and sufficient for this to happen; other factors may also be seen as 
necessary.
473
  
This study is theoretically and methodologically designed to analyze the discourse 
only, and despite the theoretical claim that everything, including material factors, are 
discursively mediated and therefore may be studied using discourse analysis
474
, I make 
no attempt at studying such other factors here. What I do show is that the dominant 
representation was an important precondition for the Norwegian peace engagement. 
This conclusion has a close affinity with the conclusions of the studies I have been 
inspired by, namely Leira, Halvard 2005 and Leira et al. 2007. The latter treats 
„Norway is a peace nation‟ as one of the most prominent self images in Norwegian 
foreign policy discourse. Although I have not emphasized the identity dimension of 
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the peace engagement discourse very heavily, my study corroborates this finding and 
gives it a firmer empirical fundament.   
7.2 Speculations about the Future of the Peace Engagement 
The findings of my study underline the dominant representation‟s importance not only 
for the adoption of the peace engagement policy, but also for its continuation. The 
policy indeed draws much of its legitimacy from the dominant representation‟s 
discursive construction of it. In other words; if this representation and the meanings 
established therein are seriously weakened, the extent of the peace promotion practice 
will likely be reduced accordingly. The increasing criticism directed against the peace 
engagement, its beginning denaturalization,  and the opening of the peace engagement 
discourse between 2003 and 2008, may be taken to mean that the dominant 
representation is already loosing ground.  
These tendencies may well be strengthened in the near future, but I think there is little 
reason to expect rapid changes. Discursive change usually takes a lot of time; 
discourses have considerable inertia and resilience. The dominant representation of the 
peace engagement has also been firmly institutionalized, and the practice of peace 
promotion is routinized.
475
 These theoretical considerations, taken together with the 
continuing strength of the dominant representation, suggest that peace engagement 
will be an important part of Norway‟s foreign policy for quite some time to come.  
7.3 Directions for Further Research 
This thesis has not aimed at theory testing. It has taken discourse analytic theories as 
its starting point and employed these to analyze and understand a specific case: the 
Norwegian peace engagement. Nevertheless, the thesis has implications beyond this 
case. It has shown that a discourse analytic framework may be fruitfully employed in 
the study of foreign policy, and that it yields non-trivial findings that other theoretical 
and methodological frameworks are unable to provide. Discourse analytic studies 
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therefore have great potential for improving our understanding of foreign policy. 
Moreover, foreign policy discourse is, at least in the case of Norway, a rather 
neglected object of study, and there is thus no lack of issues that awaits analysis.  
Here, I will point at some possible directions for further studies within the case of the 
Norwegian peace engagement. The limited scope of this thesis made it necessary to 
chose but one of a host of possible approaches to the discourse. I chose to conduct 
what may be termed a macro-level analysis, drawing on a large number of texts and 
outlining the general tendencies and developments within the discourse. This leaves a 
host of issues unexplored, and our understanding of the peace engagement discourse 
may thus be profoundly improved by further studies.  
First, the level of practice should be studied in detail. Such a study, analyzing what 
practices have been imbricated in the peace engagement discourse, and how this have 
influenced discursive developments, will give us a much more comprehensive picture 
of the discourse and its effects. Second, an in-depth, micro level analysis of some of 
the central texts within the discourse may yield insights about the productive aspect of 
the discourse; how it works and what it does. It may also give a better basis for 
exploring the discourse‟s role in constituting Norwegian identities and self images. 
Third, the peace engagement discourse‟s links to and imbrication in other discourses, 
such as the general foreign policy discourse, the security discourse, the development 
aid discourse, and the humanitarian assistance discourse, should be studied more 
extensively. Such studies will improve our understanding of the interdiscursive aspect 
of the peace engagement discourse, and the role and influence of the discourse in 
Norway‟s foreign policy. Fourth, introducing a comparative perspective, studying the 
Norwegian discourse in relation to other countries‟ discourses, may give us an 
improved basis for assessing the discourse‟s influence on the adoption of the activist 
Norwegian peace promotion policy. It may also improve our understanding or the 
discourse‟s roots, and the extent to which international influences has been important. 
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